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[1621] 
Preventing Opioid Misuse with 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: 
A Framework for Evaluating the Success 
of State Public Health Laws 
Rebecca L. Haffajee* 
The United States is in the midst of a prescription opioid overdose and misuse epidemic. 
Although many factors have contributed to the escalation of prescription painkiller 
misuse, it parallels increases in the supply and prescribing of opioids. Prominent state-
level regulatory interventions, such as the establishment of prescription drug monitoring 
programs (“PDMPs”), recognize prescribers as opioid gatekeepers. Prescribers, who are 
uniquely situated to distinguish between appropriate use and misuse of opioids, are a 
natural target for regulation. PDMPs also target patients who seek to obtain high 
volumes of prescription opioids for illicit purposes. 
 
PDMP policies are widespread but heterogeneous, largely uninformed by robust 
evidence or a systematic assessment of best practices. Whether these programs 
successfully reduce opioid misuse and overdoses remains unclear. As well, PDMPs 
present a number of legal and ethical challenges that, along with intervention 
effectiveness, warrant careful policymaker consideration going forward. This Article 
articulates and synthesizes for the first time key criteria intended to assist state regulators 
in dynamically evaluating and justifying PDMPs and other public health laws. The 
criteria focus on the legality of the policy, approaches to measure its effectiveness, and 
normative considerations that should be factored into good laws. Such a framework is 
crucial for policymakers given the complexities and magnitude of this public health 
challenge, the rich arsenal of policy options from which to choose, and the slow and 
uncertain progress in combating prescription painkiller misuse. Concluding 
recommendations include implementing PDMPs with the following features: timely and 
complete data, strong incentives for prescriber participation, user guidelines and 
education, integration into clinical work flow, and robust confidentiality and privacy 
protections. Ongoing evaluation of programs to identify features appropriate for 
retention and replication is also crucial if PDMPs are to fulfill their potential to curb 
prescription opioid overdose and misuse. 
 
 * Rebecca L. Haffajee, J.D./M.P.H., graduated from Harvard Law School and Harvard School 
of Public Health in 2006. She practiced regulatory health care law and is currently a doctoral candidate 
in the Ph.D. Program in Health Policy (Evaluative Science and Statistics concentration), Graduate 
School of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University (anticipated 2016). For their highly insightful and 
thoughtful comments and feedback in developing this Article, the Author would like to thank 
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Introduction 
The United States is in the midst of a prescription opioid misuse 
crisis. Although only five percent of the world’s population lives here, we 
consume over eighty percent of the world’s opioid supplies.1 Drug 
overdoses, over half of which are related to prescription drugs, are now 
the leading cause of injury and death in the United States.2 In 2014, 
opioids were involved in sixty-one percent of drug overdose deaths, or 
 
 1. Jane C. Ballantyne & Andrew Kolodny, Preventing Prescription Opioid Abuse: Letter to the 
Editor, 313 JAMA 1059, 1059 (2015).  
 2. Prescription Drug Overdose Data, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
drugoverdose/data/overdose.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
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28,647 deaths.3 The crisis has escalated to such levels over the past two 
decades that federal officials now characterize prescription drug misuse 
and overdose as a national “epidemic.”4  
Prescription opioid deaths are a consequence of nonmedically 
indicated use of opioids. This practice, also termed prescription opioid 
misuse and abuse (this Article uses the term “misuses to capture both), 
consists of the unintentional or intentional use of medication without a 
prescription, in a manner other than as prescribed, or for the feeling or 
experience it causes.5 The prevalence of prescription opioid misuse is 
striking. In 2013 alone, 15.3 million Americans aged twelve and older 
used prescription drugs nonmedically, and 6.5 million had done so in the 
prior month.6 Moreover, prescription opioids may serve as gateway 
drugs. There is some evidence that addicts switch to even deadlier 
substances, such as heroin, when they can no longer access, afford, or 
tamper with prescription painkillers.7 
The rise in prescription painkiller misuse is clearly correlated with 
the increasing supply and prescribing of opioids. The overall sale of 
 
 3. Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose DeathsUnited States, 2000–2014, 
64 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1378, 1379 (2016) (finding that oxycodone and hydrocodone, the 
most commonly prescribed opioid pain relievers, are involved in more overdose deaths than any other 
type of opioid, including heroin). See Margaret Warner et al., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Drug Poisoning Deaths in the United States, 1980–2008, 1 (2011); Li H. Chen et al., Nat’l Ctr. for 
Health Statistics, Drug-Poisoning Deaths Involving Opioid Analgesics: United States, 1999–2011, 
1 (2014) (specifying that misuse or abuse of prescription drugs is responsible for much of the recent 
increase in drug-poisoning deaths). 
 4. Leonard Paulozzi et al., CDC Grand Rounds: Prescription Drug OverdosesA U.S. Epidemic, 
61 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 10, 10 (2012) (characterizing prescription drug misuse as “the 
fastest growing drug problem in the United States” and prescription drug overdose as “a U.S. 
Epidemic”); Exec. Office of the President, Epidemic: Responding to America’s Prescription Drug 
Abuse Crisis 1 (2011) (calling the prescription drug misuse crisis an “epidemic”). 
 5. Prescription Drug Misuse and Abuse, Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., 
http://www.samhsa.gov/prescription-drug-misuse-abuse (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 6. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., Results from the 2013 National 
Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings (2014). 
 7. See Ian Frazier, The Antidote: Can Staten Island’s Middle-Class Neighborhoods Defeat an Overdose 
Epidemic?, The New Yorker (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/08/antidote; 
Richard C. Dart et al., Trends in Opioid Analgesic Abuse and Mortality in the United States, 372 New 
Eng. J. Med. 241, 245–47; Theodore J. Cicero & Matthew S. Ellis, JAMA Psychiatry, Abuse-
Deterrent Formulations and the Prescription Opioid Abuse Epidemic in the United States: 
Lessons Learned from OxyContin (2015). But see Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Heroin Overdose 
Deaths28 States, 2010 to 2012, 63 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 849, 852 (2014) (“[a]lthough 
some persons might be discontinuing prescription opioids and initiating heroin use as a replacement, 
results from this study indicate that recent heroin death rate increases were not significantly associated 
with decreases in [opioid pain reliever] overdose mortality.”); Wilson M. Compton et al., Relationship 
Between Nonmedical Prescription-Opioid Use and Heroin Use, 374 New Eng. J. Med. 154, 154–61 
(2016) (finding that although a subgroup of nonmedical prescription opioid users may transition to 
heroin useespecially those persons with frequent nonmedical use and those with opioid misuse or 
dependencethe timing of policy-driven efforts to curb prescription opioid availability (which 
predated the increase in the rates of heroin use) makes it unlikely that the policies induced a 
substitution effect to heroin use).   
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opioid analgesic painkillers, which increased nearly four-fold between 1999 
through 2010, parallels observed increases in opioid-related overdose 
deaths, emergency department visits, and treatment admissions.8 In 2012 
alone, providers issued 259 million opioid prescriptionsenough for every 
adult to have their own bottle of pills.9 
A heightened focus on pain management starting in the 1990s 
liberalized opioid prescribing.10 But in responding to the public health 
problem of under-treatment of pain, prescribers paradoxically have played 
a major role in creating another public health problem: the growth of 
prescription drug misuse. Twenty-five percent of nonmedical prescription 
painkiller users obtained their drugs directly from a doctor’s prescription, 
while seventy percent of users accessed drugs from family or 
friendsalmost ninety percent of whom had gotten their prescription from 
a doctor).11 In other words, the vast majority of misused prescription drugs 
are sourced directly or indirectly from prescribers.12 
Prescribers are uniquely situated to distinguish between appropriate 
use and misuse of opioids and prescribe accordingly. Several state regulatory 
interventionsmost prominently, the establishment of prescription drug 
monitoring programs (“PDMPs”)recognize prescribers as opioid 
gatekeepers.13 PDMPs also target “doctor shoppers” (patients with 
particularly high opioid consumption patterns), and diverters (individuals 
who transfer their prescribed drugs to others for illicit use). PDMPs have 
been adopted in all but one state, and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention describes them as “among the most promising state-level 
 
 8. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Vital Signs: Overdoses of Prescription Opioid Pain 
RelieversUnited States, 1999–2008, 60 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1487, 1488–91 (2011). 
 9. Christopher M. Jones et al., Sources of Prescription Opioid Pain Relievers by Frequency of 
Past-Year Nonmedical Use: United States, 2008-2011, 174 JAMA Internal Med. 802, 802–03 (2014); 
Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs: Variation Among States in Prescribing of Opioid Pain Relievers 
and BenzodiazepinesUnited States, 2012, 63 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 563 (2014). 
 10. Andrea M. Garcia, State Laws Regulating Prescribing of Controlled Substances: Balancing the 
Public Health Problems of Chronic Pain and Prescription Painkiller Abuse and Overdose, 41 J.L. Med. & 
Ethics (Supp.) 42, 42–43 (2013); Tatyana Lyapustina & G. Caleb Alexander, The Prescription Opioid 
Addiction and Abuse Epidemic: How it Happened and What We Can Do About It, The Pharmaceutical 
J. (2015), http://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/opinion/comment/the-prescription-opioid-addiction-
and-abuse-epidemic-how-it-happened-and-what-we-can-do-about-it/20068579.article (discussing the rise 
in global prescribing of opioids for pain starting in the 1990s, and claiming that the increased morbidity 
and mortality from opioids has resulted from the degree to which they have been prescribed).  
 11. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., supra note 6. 
 12. See Jones et al., supra note 9, at 802–03 (observing that those at highest risk of overdose, or 
those who use prescription opioids nonmedically on a chronic basis (that is, for 200 or more days per 
year), were at the highest risk to obtain their drugs directly from a doctor (twenty-seven percent of the 
time)). 
 13. See Barath Chakravarthy et al., Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and Other 
Interventions to Combat Prescription Opioid Abuse, 13 W. J. Emergency Med. 422, 424 (2012).  
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interventions to improve opioid prescribing, inform clinical practice, and 
protect patients at risk.”14 
Although early evidence is emerging regarding the impact of these 
interventions on opioid prescribing, misuse, and overdoses, the rapid 
proliferation of heterogeneous PDMPs has been largely uninformed by 
robust evidence or a systematic assessment of best practices. Instead, 
state replication of PDMPs has exemplified disorganized policymaking in 
the face of a serious public health crisis. Moreover, PDMPs present a 
number of legal and normative challenges that, along with intervention 
effectiveness, warrant careful policymaker consideration going forward. 
Thus, existing PDMPs offer an opportunity to reflect upon how state 
public health policymaking in this area can follow a more deliberate path 
towards success. 
This Article argues for the use of state PDMPs with the following 
features: timely and complete data; strong incentives for prescriber 
participation; user guidelines and education; integration into clinical 
workflow; and strong confidentiality protectionsincluding a requirement 
that law enforcement officials and licensing boards access individual-
identifying data only with a court-issued warrant or subpoena. Ongoing 
evaluation of PDMPs to improve understanding of best practices is also 
needed. To arrive at these recommendations, this Article articulates and 
synthesizes, for the first time, key criteria intended to assist state regulators 
in dynamically evaluating and potentially justifying public health laws. The 
criteria focus on the following: (1) the form that regulation should take 
based on analysis of the policy’s legality; (2) measurement of law 
effectiveness; and (3) normative considerations that ought to be factored 
into good public health policy. Such a streamlined framework is a critical 
tool for state regulators, given the complexities and scope of prescription 
opioid misuse, the rich arsenal of policy options available to address it, and 
slow and uncertain progress in combating this problem. Although used to 
guide PDMP policymaking, this framework also can be applied to 
interventions designed to address public health threats that exhibit similar 
characteristics to prescription drug misusethat is, those of significant 
magnitude and that may be addressed using a number of available policy 
options, the success of which is not yet obvious or common knowledge.15 
 
 14. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs), Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention 
(May 5, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdmp/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 15. The framework may also be used after identifying “critical opportunities” for public health 
lawmaking, or areas “in which law is under-performing as a public health tool in relation to the problem 
of interest.” Law can under-perform because legal interventions are few (or nonexistent) or because they 
are executing poorly, such as causing undesirable consequences. A critical opportunity satisfies three 
criteria: (1) it targets a significant public health threat; (2) its etiology is well-understood to support the 
use of law as an intervention; and (3) one or more plausible legal interventions are available to address 
the threat but are not being used to their full advantage. Michelle M. Mello et al., Critical Opportunities 
for Public Health Law: A Call for Action, 103 Am. J. Pub. Health 1979, 1979–80 (2013).  
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the current 
prescription drug misuse crisis, establishing it as a public health threat of 
substantial magnitude that evolved from a history of ebbing and flowing 
in opioid prescribing in the United States. Part I also outlines the panoply 
of regulatory interventions available to address this epidemic, including, 
most prominently, PDMPs implemented by state governments. Part II 
then lays out a framework for evaluating public health laws implemented 
by the states, which bear great responsibility to protect population health, 
and applies it to PDMPs. Key criteria are articulated that probe legal 
powers to regulate (including legal barriers to implementation), the 
effectiveness of the law at achieving identified primary and secondary 
health outcomes, and salient ethical issues raised by public health 
regulation. Finally, specific recommendations for PDMPs, generated by 
application of the evaluative framework, are set forth, with the goal of 
maximizing the chances that these policies will be a public health success. 
I.  Prescription Drug Misuse: A Public Health Epidemic 
The current prescription drug misuse and overdose epidemic 
evolved from over a century of ebbing and flowing in prescription drug 
use in America. This is the third wave of misuse, following two earlier 
eras of problematic opioid use and regulatory responses.16 The first 
escalation in misuse occurred in the late 19th century during a time when 
opioids were altogether unregulated.17 Opioids, including heroin, were 
commonly prescribed for menstrual pain, among other maladies, often 
resulting in iatrogenic morphine addiction.18 Regulation ensued, in the 
form of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, which required the content of 
drugs (including opioids) to be listed on their labels, and the 1914 
Harrison Narcotics Act, which regulated physicians by mandating that 
they write prescriptions for opioids, taxing them for such prescriptions, 
and requiring that they maintain records of drugs dispensed.19 The Act 
also restricted the quantity of opiates that could be contained in 
medicines.20 Regulation and increased medical education and treatment 
options, had the intended effect of reducing opioid overprescribing.21 
 
 16. Austin Frakt, Painkiller Abuse, a Cyclical Challenge, N.Y. Times (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2014/12/23/upshot/painkiller-abuse-a-cyclical-challenge.html?abt=0002&abg=1&_r=0.   
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.; Andrew Kolodny et al., The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public Health 
Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 36 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 559, 561 (2015) (discussing the 
limited options, other than opium and morphine, available to physicians in this era when treating pain 
symptoms).  
 19. Id.; Ellen M. Weber, Failure of Physicians to Prescribe Pharmacotherapies for Addiction: 
Regulatory Restrictions and Physician Resistance, 13 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 49, 57 (2010).  
 20. Weber, supra note 19, at 57. 
 21. Kolodny et al., supra note 18, at 562. 
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The second wave of misuse came in the mid-1950s, as reports of 
increases in opioid use and overdose deaths proliferated across the 
country.22 Regulatory responses included laws permitting involuntary 
hospitalizations of addicts, the establishment of methadone clinics for 
treating addiction under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), and 
formation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) to 
coordinate federal anti-drug efforts.23 
In the decades after this second wave, the under-treatment of pain 
was increasingly recognized as a serious public health challenge that 
necessitated changes to prescribing behavior. The United Nations even 
declared access to pain medication a human right in 1961.24 This swing 
toward the liberalization of opioid prescribing contributed substantially to 
the current misuse and overdose epidemic. In response, various 
stakeholdersincluding state and federal regulators, insurers, drug 
manufacturers, and providershave adopted a panoply of interventions 
targeting the supply of, demand for, and misuse of opioids. 
A. The Liberalization of Opioid Prescribing for Pain 
Under-treatment of pain is itself a serious public health challenge in 
the United States. An Institute of Medicine committee estimated that 
every year chronic pain affects about 100 million people and costs up to 
$560–635 billion in lost productivity and medical treatment.25 Starting in 
the 1980s, inadequate treatment of chronic pain received heightened 
scrutiny. Before this time, physicians prescribed narcotics for short-term, 
acute pain, or for pain related to cancer or end-of-life care.26 Two medical 
journal articlesthe first published in 1980 in the New England Journal 
of Medicine, and the second in Pain in 1986opened the door to more 
liberal prescribing of painkillers.27 Both studies concluded that narcotics 
can be safely prescribed for chronic pain to many patients with little risk 
of inducing addiction.28 
In 1995, Purdue Pharma introduced an extended-release, highly 
potent form of the painkiller oxycodone, known as OxyContin, which 
marked the onset of increased opioid use.29 Around the same time, drug 
manufacturers began to market their opioid drugs for chronic, non-
 
 22. Frakt, supra note 16. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., Relieving Pain in America: A Blueprint for 
Transforming Prevention, Care, Education, and Research (2011). The Institute of Medicine is now 
known as the National Academy of Sciences.  
 26. Celine Gounder, Who is Responsible for the Pain-Pill Epidemic?, The New Yorker (Nov. 8, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/who-is-responsible-for-the-pain-pill-epidemic.  
 27. Id.; Frakt, supra note 16. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Kolodny et al., supra note 18, at 562. 
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cancer pain via advertisements in well-respected journals, through 
continuing medical education courses for doctors, and by contributing 
financial support to not-for-profit organizations, such as the American 
Academy of Pain Management, the American Pain Society, and the 
Federation of State Medical Boards.30 Highly-regarded physicianssuch 
as Dr. Russell Portenoy, co-author of the Pain study and director of the 
American Pain Societyserved as the faces behind many of these drug 
company promotions.31 In 1996, the American Pain Society launched an 
aggressive campaign entitled “Pain as the Fifth Vital Sign,” the message 
of which was embraced by the Veterans Affairs health system and The 
Joint Commission, which accredits health care organizations, including 
hospitals.32 In 2004, the Federation of State Medical Boards passed a 
model policy on the use of controlled substances to treat pain.33 The 
policy encouraged state medical boards to consider under-treatment of 
pain an equally serious violation of the standard of care as over-
treatment.34 
Additionally, over the past several decades, more subtle forces have 
encouraged doctors to generously prescribe opioids. Patient satisfaction 
assessments pervade the modern practice of medicine (and even impact 
payment under pay-for-performance schemes), thereby motivating 
certain physicians to prescribe opioids if requested by patients.35 The 
medical insurer practice of reimbursing well for prescription pain 
medications further reinforces the use of opioids to treat subjective 
pain.36 Cumulatively, stakeholder group activities, financial incentives, 
and patient satisfaction considerations contributed significantly to sharp 
increases in opioid prescribing observed in the 1990s–2000s and laid the 
foundations for misuse. 
During this same period, a number of academics proposed legal 
strategies to promote opioid prescribing for pain. Building upon one 
prominent case in which a California court found a physician to have 
committed elder abuse by failing to prescribe drugs adequately to manage 
a patient’s pain,37 some academics advocated for increased state court 
recognition of tort claims against physicians who under-prescribe 
 
 30. Id.; Frakt, supra note 16. 
 31. Gounder, supra note 26. 
 32. Kolodny et al., supra note 18, at 562. 
 33. Garcia, supra note 10, at 43. 
 34. Id.; Gounder, supra note 26. 
 35. Anna Lembke, Why Doctors Prescribe Opioids to Known Opioid Abusers, 367 New Eng. J. 
Med. 1580, 1580–81 (2012). 
 36. Id.; Aleksandra Zgierska et al., Patient Satisfaction, Prescription Drug Abuse, and Potential 
Unintended Consequences, 307 JAMA 1377, 1377–78 (2012).  
 37. Garcia, supra note 10, at 42–43. 
HAFFAJEE_19 (LANGONE) (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016 4:34 PM 
August 2016] PREVENTING OPIOID MISUSE  1629 
painkillers38 or institutions that fail to satisfy a standard of care for effective 
pain relief.39 Others have recommended the development of a 
comprehensive, coordinated, national policy to address the inadequate 
management of pain, rather than the patchwork of state and federal 
policies in existence.40 Still others have questioned the appropriateness of 
criminal liability for prescribers under the CSA and instead supported an 
increased role for state medical boards in policing physician controlled 
substance prescribing.41 Many of these viewpoints, however, relied on 
older science that supported the effectiveness of opioids for treating 
chronic, non-cancer paina clinical viewpoint that is now regularly 
challenged and up for debate.42 Concerns with under-prescribing now must 
be balanced with those about over-prescribing, given our current epidemic 
of prescription drug misuse. 
B. The Rise of Prescription Painkiller Misuse 
Prescription opioid misuse in the United States has risen to 
epidemic proportions in recent years. Nonmedical use43 of prescription 
drugs occurs in four therapeutic classes (pain relievers, tranquilizers, 
stimulants, and sedatives); opioid pain relievers, however, are the most 
commonly misused medication by far.44 The percentage of Americans 
aged twenty and older who nonmedically use pain relievers in a month 
has held relatively stable at around seven percent over the past decade, 
after increasing from five percent between 1999–2002.45 However, this 
statistic fails to capture an increase in the intensity of use and misuse. For 
 
 38. See Michael J. Reynolds, Morphine or Malpractice: Should Courts Recognize a Legal Duty to 
Prescribe Opiates for Treating Chronic Pain, 15 J. C.R. & Econ. Dev. 79 (2000); Barry R. Furrow, Pain 
Management and Provider Liability: No More Excuses, 29 J.L. Med. & Ethics 28, 30–36 (2001); Gilah 
R. Mayer, Comment, Bergman v. Chin: Why an Elder Abuse Case Is a Stride in the Direction of Civil 
Culpability for Physicians Who Undertreat Patients Suffering from Terminal Pain, 37 New Eng. L. 
Rev. 313 (2003).  
 39. Furrow, supra note 38, at 37–42; Ben A. Rich, The Politics of Pain: Rhetoric or Reform?, 8 DePaul 
J. Health Care L. 519, 542 (2005). 
 40. Amy J. Dilcher, Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don’t: The Need for a Comprehensive 
Public Policy to Address the Inadequate Management of Pain, 13 Annals Health L. 81, 135 (2004). 
 41. Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in Oversight of Physician 
Opioid Prescribing for Pain: The Role of State Medical Boards, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 21, 22 (2003); 
Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance 
in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 St. Louis J. Health L. & Pol’y 231 (2008).  
 42. See Nat’l Insts. of Health, Pathways to Prevention: The Role of Opioids in the 
Treatment of Chronic Pain 35 (2014) (suggesting that for most patients, there are likely to be more 
effective approaches to managing chronic pain than opioid therapies). 
 43. For a definition of “nonmedical use,” see State Estimates of Nonmedical Use of Prescription Pain 
Relievers, Nat’l Survey on Drug Use & Health (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/ 
files/NSDUH115/NSDUH115/sr115-nonmedical-use-pain-relievers.htm. 
 44. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., supra note 6, at 15–18. 
 45. Steven M. Frenk et al., Prescription Opioid Analgesic Use Among Adults: United 
States, 1999–2012 1–2 (2015). 
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example, from 1999–2002 to 2011–2012, the percentage of opioid 
analgesic users who used a stronger-than-morphine equivalent opioid 
(per dose) in the past thirty days increased from seventeen percent to 
thirty-seven percent.46 
Moreover, adverse health consequences resulting from prescription 
drug misuseincluding overdose events, emergency department (“ED”) 
visits, and inpatient admissionshave escalated dramatically. Fatal opioid 
overdoses exploded from 1.4 per 100,000 people in 1999 to 9.0 per 100,000 
people in 2014.47 The rate of emergency department visits involving 
nonmedical use of prescription drugsprimarily of opioidsmore than 
doubled from 214 visits per 100,000 people in 2004 to 458 in 2011.48 About 
half of these deaths and ED visits also involved at least one other drug, 
including benzodiazepines, cocaine, or heroin.49 The proportion of 
substance abuse treatment admissions citing pain reliever misuse also 
more than quadrupled from 1998 and 2008.50 
Prescription opioid use and misuse persists among people from 
diverse demographic backgrounds, albeit certain groups exhibit slightly 
higher rates of use and overdose risk. Adults aged forty and older are 
slightly more likely to use opioid analgesics than adults aged twenty to 
thirty-nine; women are slightly more likely than men to use opioids; and 
non-Hispanic white adults are more likely to use prescription painkillers 
than Hispanic adults.51 People at heightened risk for opioid overdose 
include women, those consuming high daily doses of opioids, those 
taking medication for chronic pain, “doctor-shoppers,”52 users of multiple 
abusable substances, and those with substance abuse or other mental 
health issues.53 
 
 46. Id. at 2.  
 47. Chen et al., supra note 3, at 2; Rudd et al., supra note 3, at 1378. 
 48. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., The DAWN Report: Highlights of 
the 2011 Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) Findings on Drug-Related Emergency 
Department Visits 5 (2013).  
 49. Id.; Warner et al., supra note 3, at 1. 
 50. Exec. Office of the President, 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: 
Highlights (2011). 
 51. Frenk et al., supra note 45, at 3–6. 
 52. Clinical definitions of “doctor shoppers” differ. See Scott G. Weiner et al., Characteristics of 
Emergency Department “Doctor Shoppers,” 48 J. Emergency Med. 424, 425 (2014) (defining “doctor 
shoppers” as patients that had eight or more Schedule II-V prescriptions filled from eight or more providers 
in one year); Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth E. Carlson, Estimating the Prevalence of Opioid Diversion by 
“Doctor Shoppers” in the United States, 8 PLOS ONE 1, (2013) (using different thresholds to define “doctor 
shoppers” to estimate opioid diversion prevalence). See Joseph Logan et al., Opioid Prescribing in 
Emergency Departments: The Prevalence of Potentially Inappropriate Prescribing and Misuse, 51 Med. Care 
646 (2013) (identifying the following as indicators of potential inappropriate use: opioid prescriptions 
overlapping by one week or more; overlapping opioid and benzodiazepine prescriptions; high daily doses of 
greater than or equal to 100 morphine milligram equivalents; long-acting/extended-release (“LA/ER”) 
opioids for acute pain; and overlapping LA/ER opioids).  
 53. Kate M. Dunn et al., Opioid Prescriptions for Chronic Pain and Overdose: A Cohort Study, 
152 Annals Internal Med. 85, 87–91 (2010); Amy S.B. Bohnert et al., Association Between Opioid 
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There is little room for optimism. Evidence from 2011–2013 did 
indicate a leveling off in opioid prescribing rates and overdoses nationally,54 
which some researchers attributed to the August 2010 reformulation of 
OxyContin to a more tamper-resistant form.55 However, more recent 
evidence shows that national prescription opioid overdose death rates again 
significantly increased from 2013–2014,56 suggesting that existing policy 
interventions may not be sufficient to tackle the epidemic. Over this same 
period, moreover, heroin abuse rates increased, suggesting that 
somethough not allprescription drug misusers switched to an illegal, 
cheaper, and deadlier alternative when they could no longer access 
prescription opioids.57 
C. Regulatory Responses 
Federal and state policymakers, among others, have responded with a 
multitude of interventions to address opioid misuse and overdoses. Table 1 
catalogues prominent interventions and identifies the stakeholders that 
typically take these measures. Although not exhaustive, this list illustrates 
the many strategies available and the complex array of implementers. These 
strategies are characterized within the public health prevention paradigm 
used for epidemiologic responses to other communicable and non-
communicable diseases. Opioid addictioncompulsive opioid seeking and 
use despite the often negative consequences58is the chronic disease that 
can result from prescription opioid misuse.59 
Addiction prevention strategies can be organized into categories 
that focus on: (1) primary prevention of new cases of opioid addiction; (2) 
secondary prevention to identify and treat early cases of addiction; and 
 
Prescribing Patterns and Opioid Overdose-Related Deaths, 305 JAMA 1315, 1315–21 (2011); Alan G. 
White et al., Analytic Models to Identify Patients at Risk for Prescription Opioid Abuse, 15 Am. J. 
Managed Care 897, 897–906 (2009); B.L. Wilsey et al., Profiling Multiple Provider Prescribing of 
Opioids, Benzodiazepines, Stimulants, and Anorectics, 112 Drug & Alcohol Dependence 99 (2010). 
See Anupam B. Jena et al., Opioid Prescribing by Multiple Providers in Medicare: Retrospective 
Observational Study of Insurance Claims, 348 British Med. J. 1393 (2014) (finding that concurrent 
opioid prescribing by multiple providers in Medicare patients is associated with higher rates of opioid-
related hospital admissions).  
 54. See Dart et al., supra note 7, at 241. 
 55. Id.; Marc R. Larochelle et al., Rates of Opioid Dispensing and Overdose After Introduction of 
Abuse-Deterrent Extended-Release Oxycodone and Withdrawal of Propoxyphene, 175 JAMA 
Internal Med. 978 (2015); Cicero & Ellis, supra note 7, at 424. 
 56. Rudd et al., supra note 3, at 1378–79. 
 57. Dart et al., supra note 7; Larochelle et al., supra note 55; Brian Owens, Tackling Prescription 
Drug Abuse, The Pharmaceutical J. (June 11, 2015), http://www.pharmaceuticaljournal.com/news-and-
analysis/features/tackling-prescription-drug-abuse/20068685.article?adfesuccess=1; Compton et al., supra 
note 7. 
 58. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Prescription Drug Abuse 3 (2014). Addiction can 
also include physical dependence, or where an individual experiences withdrawal symptoms when use 
of a drug is suddenly stopped or reduced. Id. 
 59. Kolodny et al., supra note 18, at 565. 
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(3) tertiary prevention to effectively treat those already addicted.60 The 
goal of primary prevention is to reduce the incidence of diseasein this 
case, to prevent the initiation of opioid addiction. Prescriber guidelines 
are an example of primary prevention, because they seek to encourage 
more informed opioid prescribing. Secondary prevention measures aim 
to identify and treat a serious health condition after onset but before 
serious complications ensue,61 such as detecting doctor shoppers by 
means of a PDMP. Finally, tertiary prevention measures provide therapy 
and rehabilitation once a disease is firmly established.62 Access to the 
opioid antagonist drugs (such as naloxone) is an example of tertiary 
prevention. 
Undoubtedly, some combination of these prevention measures is 
required to comprehensively address prescription opioid-related morbidity 
and mortalitybut which specific interventions are most worthwhile to 
pursue? This Article focuses on a specific type of intervention: prescription 
drug monitoring programs, which will be referred to as “PDMPs” 
throughout. Other prevention measures are unquestionably key 
components to comprehensively addressing the epidemic, but PDMPs are 
a popular, state-level, legal mechanism that have gained the reputation of 
having incredible promise for addressing opioid misuse.63 They primarily 
target prescribing, a significant upstream driver of prescription opioid 
misuse because it serves as the prerequisite to most opioid 
addictionwhether by initial prescription, repeat prescriptions, or obtaining 
drugs from friends or family members or diverters.64 And, PDMPs have 
experienced widespreadalbeit disorganizedroll-out among the states, 
such that policies exhibit widely varying features not rigorously informed by 
evidence or systematic criteria for determining their success. 
 
 60. Id. at 565–69. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Chakravarthy et al., supra note 13, at 424.  
 64. Wilson M. Compton et al., Prescription Opioid Abuse: Problems and Responses, 80 Preventive 
Med. 5 (2015). See Jones et al., supra note 9, at 802–03 (underscoring the need to target prescribers, as 
they commonly source opioids to frequent users).  
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Table I. Interventions to Curb Prescription Drug Misuse 
 











 State and local 
governments 
 Health care providers  
 Federal government  





(“REMS”)65 required of 
extended-release/long-
acting (“ER/LA”) opioid 
drug sponsors 
Pain management clinic 
(“pill mill”)66 regulation*  
 State governments  
 Federal government  
o Drug Enforcement 
Agency (“DEA”) 
Opioid drug approval*   Federal government 




 Opioid drug developers 
Medication take-back or 
disposal programs* 
 Federal government  
o DEA 
 State or local governments 
 Retail pharmacies 
Secondary 
prevention 
Identify and treat 
prescription 
opioid addiction 





monitoring programs**   
 State governments 
 Insurers 














 State and local governments 
 
 65. Under the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (“FDAAA”) of 2007, REMS 
was introduced as a risk-management strategy intended to reduce known or serious safety hazards 
associated with a drug or biologic product. The FDAAA grants the FDA authority to require sponsors 
to submit a REMS prior to drug approval if it determines that such a measure is necessary to ensure 
that drug benefits outweigh risks, or after approval if new safety information emerges to necessitate 
such a strategy. Inst. of Med., Ethical & Sci. Issues in Studying the Safety of Approved Drugs 42–
43 (2012). See infra note 152 for a discussion of the REMS for ER/LA opioid medications. 
 66. “Pill mills” are those facilities where pain management is the primary practice component, or 
which provide pain treatment to a majority (greater than fifty percent) of patients, or both. Ctrs. for 
Disease Control & Prevention, Menu of Pain Management Clinic Regulation 1 (2012).  
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 Health care providers 
 Governments (federal, 
state, local) 
Access to opioid 
overdose reversal drugs 
 State and local 
governments 
 Insurers and PBMs 
Syringe exchange 
programs 




* These interventions can also be considered secondary prevention 
measures. 
** These interventions could be considered primary, secondary, or tertiary 
prevention measures, because they aim to identify either misusers or 
diverters and prevent them from accessing opioids (which can then be 
passed on to “unexposed” persons) and can be used to direct misusers into 
treatment programs.  
1. State PDMPs 
State PDMPs are the most prevalent state policy mechanism used to 
address prescription drug misuse, with forty-nine states and the District 
of Columbia having enacted programs.68 PDMPs digitally store 
controlled substance dispensing information in a centralized, statewide 
database and make that information accessible to “authorized users,” 
including prescribers, pharmacists, and sometimes law enforcement 
officials and state medical boards.69 When they query the system about a 
patient, authorized users typically see the dose, supply, and prescriber of 
scheduled drugs that the patient has recently filled.70 Authorized users 
can only access the data with log-in credentials provided upon registering 
with the PDMP. 
PDMPs seek to satisfy many goals, most prominently to support 
providers in facilitating the legitimate medical use of controlled substances, 
while avoiding prescription drug misuse.71 Armed with PDMP-supplied 
information about a patient, prescribers and pharmacists can communicate 
 
 67. “Doctor shopping” is defined as when a patient obtains controlled substances from multiple 
healthcare providers without the prescribers’ knowledge of the other prescriptions. Ctrs. for Disease 
Control & Prevention, Doctor Shopping Laws 1 (2012). 
 68. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, Annual Review of Prescription Monitoring 
Programs 2 (2014).  
 69. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Ctr. of Excellence at Brandeis, Briefing on 
PDMP Effectiveness 3 (2014).  
 70. Rebecca L. Haffajee et al., Mandatory Use of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, 313 JAMA 
891 (2015). 
 71. Kristin Finklea et al., Cong. Research Serv., Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs 3 
(2014) (additionally identifying public health trend surveillance as a PDMP purpose). 
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with the patient about his or her prescription histories, address potentially 
dangerous co-prescribing of substances, refrain from supplying opioids to a 
doctor shopper72 or diverter, comfortably provide prescription drugs to an 
individual who doesn’t raise concerns about misuse, and direct individuals 
into substance abuse treatment therapy when clinically indicated.73 When 
enough providers share dispensing information and access patient 
profiles via PDMPs, opioid misusers and diverters have a harder time 
“gaming” the system by seeking drugs from multiple providers or 
pharmacies. As well, PDMPs are intended to help regulators investigate 
clinicians with inappropriate prescribing and dispensing patterns as well 
as patients with drug fill behaviors indicative of misuse or diversion.74 In 
sum, PDMPs aim to improve individual as well as population health, by 
improving prescribing and dispensing decisions made for each patient, 
and by limiting the negative externalities generated by the over-supply of 
opioids.75 
State legislatures create PDMPs by statute and outline program 
details by regulation, often leaving many of the operational particulars to 
the executive agency in which the program is housed.76 Advances in 
information technology facilitated state implementation of electronic 
PDMPs in the 1990s–2000s.77 These programs succeeded earlier, less-
widespread paper prescription monitoring systems (also known as carbon 
copy or triplicate paper programs), the first of which was created in 
California in 1939.78 Since the first electronic PDMP was established in 
Oklahoma in 1990, these programs have rapidly proliferated.79 In 2001, 
sixteen states had authorized the creation of a program by statute; and by 
June 2012, forty-nine states and one territory had passed such laws (with 
forty-one states having an operational program).80 Today, every state 
except Missouri has an operational PDMP.81 
 
 72. See supra note 52 for clinical definitions of “doctor shoppers.”  
 73. Haffajee et al., supra note 70, at 891. 
 74. Finklea et al., supra note 71, at 3.  
 75. See G. Caleb Alexander et al., Rethinking Opioid Prescribing to Protect Patient Safety and 
Public Health, 308 JAMA 1865, 1865–66 (2012) (suggesting that a public health approach to the 
treatment of pain calls for greater clinical judiciousness in prescribing of opioids given the harmful 
effects that clinicians’ treatment decisions have on other individuals beyond the patient being treated).  
 76. PDMPs are most commonly housed within health agencies or boards of pharmacy, although 
some are housed within law enforcement or other agencies. The housing agency distributes PDMP 
data to individuals authorized under state law to receive the information. Richard A. Deyo et al., 
Measures Such as Interstate Cooperation Would Improve the Efficacy of Programs to Track Controlled 
Drug Prescriptions, 32 Health Aff. 603, 604 (2013).  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Thomas Clark et al., Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: An Assessment of the 
Evidence for Best Practices 3, The Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Ctr. of Excellence, 
Brandeis Univ. (2012). 
 80. Id. at 5.  
 81. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 2. 
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PDMPs vary widely along a number of dimensions,82 including: who 
can query the data (and for what purposes);83 whether unsolicited reports 
are sent to users;84 whether prescribers and/or dispensers can delegate 
access to an authorized agent;85 whether notification of a patient is 
required when his/her data is accessed;86 the extent to which data is 
shared with other states;87 how frequently the data is updated;88 and 
whether training is required for users.89 PDMPs increasingly monitor (or 
track) drugs that are included in Schedules II through V of the DEA’s 
controlled substances schedules.90 Recent innovations gaining traction 
with states include mandates that clinicians query the data for 
information regarding a patient, under specified circumstances.91 Also on 
the PDMP policy horizon is the integration of PDMP data into clinical 
 
 82. See id. for an updated comparison of program features. See generally Deyo et al., supra note 
76, at 605–07 (describing the variations in program design and controversies surrounding prescription 
drug monitoring programs).  
 83. Forty-eight states include prescribers, dispensers, licensing boards, and law enforcement 
officials as “authorized users.” Only eighteen states require law enforcement to access the data only 
with a warrant, subpoena, or other judicial process, whereas thirty states allow such access pursuant 
merely to an active investigation. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 25–26, 
31.  
 84. Forty-five states send unsolicited reports to individuals varying from prescribers, to law 
enforcement officials, to licensing officials. The triggers for and information included in these reports 
vary widely. Id. at 45.  
 85. In thirty-four states, prescribers and/or dispensers can delegate access to an agent who can log 
into the system on their behalf. Agents can include a physician’s assistant, nurse practitioner, 
pharmacy technician, or other health personnel. Id. at 21.  
 86. Patients must be notified when their PDMP data is accessed in eleven states. Id. at 9.  
 87. Although forty-five states have authorized interstate data sharing, only thirty-two states currently 
share data. Id. at 34; Interstate Data Sharing, Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training & Tech. 
Assistance Ctr. (Aug. 2015), http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/Interstate_Data_Sharing.pdf (last visited Aug. 
5, 2016). 
 88. Over half of state PDMPs update the data weekly or less frequently, while only one program 
offers real-time data. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 12–13. 
 89. PDMP training is required of authorized users in only thirteen states, although most states 
offer optional training. Id. at 36.  
 90. Schedule I drugs have high misuse potential and are not prescribed legally (they currently 
have no medically accepted use in the United States)thus, drugs such as heroin or ecstasy cannot be 
tracked. Schedule II drugs are those with a high potential for misuse but a medically accepted use, 
such as oxycodone, morphine, and stimulants. Schedule III drugs are those with moderate misuse 
potential and a medically accepted use, such as buprenorphine. Schedule IV drugs are those with low 
misuse potential and a medically accepted use, such as benzodiazepines and hypnotics. Finally, 
Schedule V drugs are those with the lowest potential for misuse and a medically accepted use, such as 
cough syrups with codeine and anti-diarrheals. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (West 
2016). 
 91. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 3, 40 (identifying twenty-four 
states as having some form of mandate, although conditions and exemptions vary widely). See 
Haffajee et al., supra note 70, at 891–92 (outlining the pros and cons of requiring prescribers to 
participate in querying PDMP systems, and arguing that while mandates may be called for, given the 
magnitude of prescription drug misuse and early indications of mandate effectiveness, more robust 
evidence and guidelines to support their implementation are necessary to avoid potentially dire 
unintended consequencessuch as under-prescribing of opioids for legitimate pain). 
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workflow (such as electronic medical records) and improved interstate 
sharing of data to track those individuals who travel across state lines in 
pursuit of prescription drugs.92 
PDMPs are perhaps so attractive because they hold the potential to 
both facilitate legitimate prescribing of controlled substances, and also 
mitigate prescription drug misuse.93 The appropriate prescribing of 
controlled substances can reduce their misuse and diversion. At the same 
time, law enforcement, licensing board, and surveillance efforts can 
protect the public’s health by limiting diversion.94 
Despite these best intentions, we do not have a firm understanding of 
PDMPs’ effectiveness, nor of the potential for unintended PDMP 
consequences or other legal or ethical quagmires. Interest groups, however, 
have attempted to identify a number of PDMP “best practices” to help 
guide their implementation. They include the following: a comprehensive list 
of drugs monitored; unsolicited reporting to providers; medical provider 
education on PDMP use; a wide array of authorized users; real-time or 
frequent data collection; interstate sharing of data; and disclosure of de-
identified data for research purposes.95 These characteristics appear to be 
identified largely based on face validity and anecdotal or associative 
observations, rather than rigorous evidence.96 In short, justification for 
these features is wanting. The framework presented herein can assist in 
systematically analyzing PDMP effectiveness, legality, and normative 
appeal, with the goal of identifying desirable features that, if adopted, 
could facilitate the achievement of public health goals and increase the 
likelihood that these policies will succeed. 
II.  A Framework for Evaluating PDMP Success 
State policymakers stand to benefit from an evaluative framework 
that can be used to assess the success of PDMP efforts at curbing 
prescription drug misuse for several reasons. First, the rapid escalation 
and magnitude of the prescription drug misuse and overdoseswith 
forty-four people in the United States now dying every day from 
prescription painkiller overdose97are remarkable and somewhat 
 
 92. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 3. 
 93. Id.; Clark et al., supra note 79, at 5. 
 94. Clark et al., supra note 79, at 5. 
 95. Id.; Nat’l Conference of Ins. Legislators, Proposed Best Practices to Address Opioid 
Abuse, Misuse and Diversion §§ 1–4 (2013).  
 96. Clark et al., supra note 79 (reviewing the PDMP evidence comprehensively but failing to 
differentiate between studies appropriate for causal inferencethat is, those that demonstrate effects 
attributable to PDMPsand those of a merely associative or anecdotal nature). See infra Parts 
III.B.2–3 for further discussion on evaluating PDMP effectiveness.  
 97. Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States Hit Record Numbers in 2014, Ctrs. for Disease 
Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 
2016). 
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unprecedented. Such a crisis warrants a robust and effective response, 
which has led to rapid dissemination across the states of new legal 
approaches, including PDMPs, before their effects have been thoroughly 
evaluated. Second, the intervention possibilitiesfrom various PDMP 
features to other types of interventions altogether (see Table 1 for a 
non-exhaustive list)are numerous and could be overwhelming to 
policymakers. Third, some indications of a leveling of opioid prescribing 
and misuse from 2011–2013 are encouraging, but naturally beg the 
question: Can we attribute any of these changes to state PDMPs? 
It is incumbent upon policymakers at all levels to implement the 
most prudent set of interventions possible to target prescription opioid 
misuse, given current knowledge and limited resources. The states are a 
reasonable and critical locus for policymaking.98 This Article does not 
mean to imply that states are the exclusive or always optimal level at 
which to regulate.99 Indeed, the federal government is very involved in 
regulation of controlled substances, particularly under the CSA and via 
FDA drug approval (see Table 1). However, the states have broadly 
regulated to address prescription drug misuse and overdose using their 
plenary powers to police the health, safety, and welfare of their 
citizens.100 As compared to the federal government, states are closer in 
proximity to these issues: They can better tailor prevention strategies to 
the specific nature of and variation in prescribing and misuse risks across 
their jurisdictions, and are directly accountable to their citizens when it 
comes to adverse health and related consequences.101 Moreover, states 
have typically assumed authority over the practice of medicine and other 
health professions as well as health more generally,102 and thus the 
 
 98. See Garcia, supra note 10, at 43.  
 99. See Joanna Shepherd, Combating the Prescription Painkiller Epidemic: A National Prescription 
Drug Reporting Program, 40 Am. J.L. & Med. 85, 86–87 (2014) (advocating for a national prescription 
drug reporting program that builds upon pharmacy benefit manager networks to crack down on 
prescription drug misuse); see also Roger S. Magnusson, Mapping the Scope and Opportunities for Public 
Health Law in Liberal Democracies, 35 J.L. Med. & Ethics 571, 572 (2007) (noting that public health 
regulatory functions are “shared” between different tiers of government, and together these elements at 
the national and sub-national levels create a range of specific laws, processes, and remedies for improving 
health outcomes).  
 100. States have initiated many prominent laws to address prescription drug misuse and overdose 
beyond PDMPs. Other legal strategies include pain clinic (or “pill mill”) laws; drug dose and limit laws; 
physical examination requirements; doctor shopping laws; tamper-resistant form requirements; prescription 
drug identification laws; and Good Samaritan laws that provide protection to those who reasonably assist 
others experiencing misuse or overdose. See Public Health Law Program: State Laws on Prescription Drug 
Misuse and Abuse, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/ 
topic/prescription.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 101. Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint 118 (2d ed. 2008); Scott 
Burris & Evan Anderson, Legal Regulation of Health-Related Behavior: A Half Century of Public 
Health Law Research, 9 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 95, 107 (2013).  
 102. See Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954); Michelle M. Mello & Kathryn Zeiler, 
Disease Prevention and Health Outcomes, Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of the Field, 
96 Geo. L.J. 649, 654 (2008) (noting that states have been the primary site of lawmaking for important 
HAFFAJEE_19 (LANGONE) (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016 4:34 PM 
August 2016] PREVENTING OPIOID MISUSE  1639 
prescribing of controlled substances (the source of most prescription 
drugs that are misused) falls squarely within their purview. This Article 
addresses the balance of regulation between state and federal 
governments as it relates to how states can best target PDMPs,103 but it 
does not cover non-governmental-based initiatives. 
The separation of public health powers among different branches of 
government, albeit fundamental to the way policies are conceived and 
carried out, is not a focus of this Article. “State policymakers” or “state 
regulators,” as referred to herein, signify members of both the legislative 
and executive branches of state governments. Members of the legislature, 
who are elected and politically accountable to the public, are typically 
responsible for creating health policy and allocating resources required 
to carry it out.104 Executive agencies, most notably departments of public 
health,105 assume increasingly expansive public health functions in the 
statesranging from proposing laws to the legislature, to issuing rules to 
carry out policy, to enforcing policy.106 The framework proposed views 
state policymakers as a monolithic group, capable of dividing and 
delegating public health powers as between themselves efficiently and in 
accordance with administrative law requirements. 
This discussion also focuses on state public health laws,107 namely 
PDMPs, rather than other types of interventions.108 Law is increasingly 
recognized as an important determinant of health and a valuable and 
effective tool in the public health arsenal.109 Law has been shown to have 
a powerful impact in a number of public health domains, such as motor 
 
aspects of health markets, including public health-related areas such as seatbelt and workplace 
wellness, tobacco and alcohol, and unhealthful food and beverages in schools). 
 103. See infra Part II.A.2.  
 104. Gostin, supra note 101, at 83.  
 105. Id. at 161. 
 106. Id. at 83–84, 166–69.  
 107. “Public health law” has been famously defined by Lawrence O. Gostin as “the study of the 
legal powers and duties of government to assure the conditions for people to be healthy (that is, to 
identify, prevent, and ameliorate risks to health in the population), and the limitations on the power of 
the state to constrain the autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary, or other legally protected interests of 
individuals for protection or promotion of community health.” Id. at 4. Themes that emerge from this 
definition and that will recur throughout this Article include: “(1) government power and duty, (2) 
coercion and limits of state power, (3) government partners in the ‘public health system,’ (4) the 
population focus, (5) communities and civic participation, (6) the prevention orientation, and (7) social 
justice.” Lawrence O. Gostin, A Theory and Definition of Public Health Law, 10 J. Health Care L. & 
Pol’y 1, 1 (2007). 
 108. Magnusson, supra note 99, at 572 (observing that law is only one of a multitude of “modes” of 
regulation that reflect different strategies toward compliance and enforcement). 
 109. Mello et al., supra note 15, at 1979 (discussing law’s recent success in preventing childhood 
lead poisoning and workplace injuries). See Scott Burris et al., Making the Case for Laws That Improve 
Health: A Framework for Public Health Law Research, 88 Milbank Q. 169, 170 (2011); Wendy E. 
Parmet, The Individual Mandate: Implications for Public Health Law, 39 J.L. Med. & Ethics 401, 411 
(2011).  
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vehicle safety, particularly when based on robust evidence.110 Specifically, 
state laws are starting to proliferate in public health: The adoption of 
legal interventions in a number of areas (PDMPs included) over the past 
several decades has followed a steep curve from initial adoption in one 
jurisdiction to nearly fifty-state saturation.111 Non-legal interventions are 
also critical to addressing opioid misuse and the public’s health more 
generally, but the use of PDMP laws“on the books” (such as constitutions, 
statutes, rules, and judicial opinions) and as implemented in practice112by 
policymakers to address opioid misuse constitutes the focus of this 
discussion. 
This Article articulates a framework to assist state lawmakers’ 
decisionmaking when considering whether and how to respond to a 
significant public health threat, and uses it to directly guide PDMP 
implementation.113 This framework, which can be generalized to contexts 
beyond prescription drug misuse, sets forth key criteria with which to 
justify and assess public health lawsboth when considering initial policy 
enactment and in evaluating regulations once implemented. The goal is 
to identify the optimal form that a public health law should take once a 
serious public health challenge has been identified. Broadly, the 
evaluative criteria include: (1) legal powers to regulate and barriers to 
implementation; (2) effectiveness of regulation; and (3) ethical and 
normative considerations. 
This evaluative framework integrates and builds upon earlier public 
health law scholarship, including work on evidence-based lawmaking114 
and justificatory conditions for public health legal interventions.115 Mello 
and Zeiler outline an ideal iterative process of research and policymaking 
that a health law, informed by evidence, would takea so-called 
“lifecycle” for an empirical health law success story.116 In their lifecycle, 
society first identifies a significant public health risk factor derived from 
 
 110. Burris & Anderson, supra note 101, at 107.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Burris et al., supra note 109, at 174–75. “Legal interventions,” as discussed herein, may 
include a full range of government use of legal authority, such as adoption of new laws, amendments 
or clarifications to existing laws, and removal of laws thought to be ineffective. Mello et al., supra note 
15, at 1980.  
 113. Gostin has outlined at least five models, or levers, for legal intervention designed to prevent 
injury and disease and promote the public’s health: (1) the power to tax and spend; (2) the power to 
alter the informational environment; (3) direct regulation of individuals (such as motorcycle helmet 
laws), professionals (such as licenses), or businesses (such as inspections); (4) indirect regulation 
through the tort system; and (5) deregulation. Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law: A Renaissance, 
30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 136, 137–38 (2002). This Article deals primarily with the first three intervention 
levers, or affirmative regulatory acts engaged in by policymakers.  
 114. See generally Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102; Burris et al., supra note 109 (discussing the 
newly founded Public Health Law Research Program and its mission, structure, and goals). 
 115. See generally Gostin, supra note 101 (discussing the legal foundations of public health 
research). 
 116. See Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 668–69. 
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clear epidemiological evidence.117 Risk factors are exposures or attributes 
that are associated with an increased likelihood of developing a disease 
or injury.118 Significant risk factors can be characterized as variables that 
greatly increase the risk of developing a disease, or those that are associated 
with severe harm. Second, in response to such risks, policymakers, 
researchers, or other key stakeholders may propose and experiment with 
innovative legal solutions, among other types of policy responses.119 Third, 
these experiments should be evaluated by researchers and policymakers, 
ideally in cooperation. Finally, those public health laws identified as 
successful should be retained, strengthened, and replicated in additional 
jurisdictions, while those deemed unsuccessful should be abandoned (or 
amended) in favor of policy alternatives.120 
Lawrence Gostin has articulated certain prerequisite conditions for 
public health laws, reminding us that regulation is not justified merely in 
the name of population health.121 Such laws must be defended given that 
they incur public and private costs and can impact the legitimacy of 
future policymaking.122 Gostin thus proposes five criteria with which to 
evaluate whether a public health regulation is warranted: (1) significant 
risk; (2) effectiveness; (3) economic cost; (4) burden on individuals; and 
(5) fairness.123 
Figure 1 lays out the four stages articulated in Mello and Zeiler’s 
lifecycle,124 but goes a step further to specify the specific criteria with 
which to actually evaluate policy experiments and the ways in which 
these criteria should be applied to justify any particular law’s existence. 
Innovative concepts incorporated into this figure include: (1) that 
evaluative criteria should be applied both at the law adoption stage as 
well as the retrospective evaluation (of existing policy) stage; (2) that the 
evaluation should be an ongoing process, rather than a one-time 
occurrence; and (3) that states should revisit a policy upon each round of 
evaluation to consider whether to retain, amend, or abandon a law. 
Moreover, the specific evaluative criteria set forth in Figure 1 differ 
from Gostin’s in several key regards. First, whereas Gostin does not focus 
on a particular level of authority or jurisdiction, these criteria are intended 
to organize state policymaker inquiries with respect to implementing public 
health laws. Second, the criteria explicitly recognize legality as a 
consideration to be incorporated into evaluation. Third, they re-
 
 117. Id. See Gostin, supra note 101, at 55. 
 118. Health Topics: Risk Factors, World Health Org., http://www.who.int/topics/risk_factors/en/ 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016).  
 119. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 669. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Gostin, supra note 101, at 43–76. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 55.  
 124. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 668. 
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characterize and substantially expand upon the inquiries regarding policy 
effectiveness and ethical appeal, drawing upon principles of research 
design and practice-based public health ethics, respectively. The key 
evaluative criteria further detailed below do not necessarily need to be 
“satisfied” per se, but should be considered carefully and compared 
between policy options, if multiple exist. Performing favorably under 
these criteria lends credibility to public health laws and enhances state 
policymaker and stakeholder confidence in their value. Consideration of 
these criteria also may help to address issues of antiquity, inconsistency, 
redundancy, and ambiguity that can render state public health laws 
ineffective.125 In the discussion that follows, the three criteria will be 
outlined and directly applied to PDMPs in an effort to organize and 
inform this policymaking agenda. 
 
 
 125. Gostin, supra note 113, at 136–37 (discussing entrenched problems with state public health 
lawsthat is, that they are often outdated, built up in layers over varying periods of time, and very 
fragmented among the fifty statesthat call for reform so that law conforms with modern scientific 
and legal standards, is consistent across jurisdictions, and is more uniform in how it addresses different 
types of health threats). 
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A. Legal Powers to Regulate 
 A threshold inquiry for state policymakers when considering 
PDMPs and other public health laws is whether the requisite legal 
powers to regulate exist, and/or whether legal barriers may frustrate 
implementation. This inquiry drives to the heart of longstanding debates 
about the appropriate balance of public health powers between different 
levels of government, and constitutional limits on such powers in the 
name of civil liberties. Legal powers, duties, and restraints, to use 
Gostin’s terms,126 define the space available for public health intervention 
and should be considered dynamically, given the potential for changes in 
judicial interpretation of these parameters. State policymakers should 
specifically ask: (1) whether they have the affirmative constitutional 
power to act to promote or protect the public’s health; (2) whether the 
actions planned or taken exceed their powers by encroaching upon 
regulatory territory already occupied by the federal government; and (3) 
whether the law in question infringes upon protected individual rights.127 
In general terms, state implementation of PDMPs stands on solid 
legal footing. Nevertheless, the ways in which PDMPs are designed raise 
a number of legal issues that warrant consideration, including the federal 
government’s possible role in program implementation, privacy issues 
associated with the retention of personal health information in the 
databases, and the use of the data by law enforcement and licensing 
boards. 
1. Federalism and the Power to Regulate the Public’s Health 
Federalism divides available lawmaking power between two levels 
of government: federal and state.128 The federal government acts with 
limited, enumerated powers granted by the Constitution, while the 
remaining powers, including the police power, are left to the states.129 
State governments have long held the authority, and sometimes duty,130 
 
 126. Gostin, supra note 101. 
 127. See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J.L. & 
Health 309, 311 (1998). 
 128. Gostin, supra note 101, at 78.  
 129. Hodge, Jr., supra note 127, at 311. The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved for the States 
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X. 
 130. The Constitution is largely cast in negative terms, particularly with respect to public health 
protection among the states. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 
(1989) (holding that the Wisconsin State Department of Social Services had no affirmative duty to 
provide protection to a four-year-old boy who was beaten severely and incurred permanent brain 
damage after the Department received reports of the abuse and took no action). There are, however, 
certain instances whereby the Constitution creates an affirmative duty for the government to protect 
people from harm or provide health services, including: (1) for persons held in state custody (such as 
prisons and mental institutions) who have been deprived of their liberty and are thus unable to care 
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to protect and preserve public health, a critical role which dates to the 
Federalist Papers and preceded the Constitution.131 As articulated in what 
is widely viewed as a leading judicial decision in public health, Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts, decided in 1905, state police powers include broad 
powers to pursue reasonable regulations that promote the public health, 
safety, welfare, or morals.132 While Jacobson dealt with infectious 
diseasenamely, the right of the City of Cambridge, Massachusetts to 
require smallpox vaccinationthe police power articulated therein 
serves as the basis for a vast array of state public health laws ranging into 
areas of non-communicable disease and injury.133 Beyond the police 
power, states also posses parens patriae powers to act as guardians of 
those who cannot protect themselves legally, namely children and 
incompetent persons.134 
Although Jacobson is settled law and the states possess significant 
power to police and protect the public’s health, they do not exclusively 
inhabit the domain.135 Rather, the federal government has a role to play 
in the areas in which it has clearly articulated jurisdiction under the 
Constitution. Federal public health powers typically are found in the U.S. 
Congress’s powers to tax, spend, regulate interstate commerce, and 
employ the means reasonably necessary to achieving other federal 
objectives (implied under the Necessary and Proper Clause).136 If there is 
overlap between federal and state laws in these arenas, then federal law 
supersedes (or preempts) that of the stateseven where states have 
 
for themselves; or (2) if the state increased the threat of harm, and is responsible for creating danger. 
Gostin, supra note 101, at 87.  
 131. Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism, 30 J.L. Med. & 
Ethics 201, 202 (2002) (noting that the Federalist Papers refer to the “domestic police” of the states as 
among the powers not available to the federal government); Hodge, Jr. supra note 127, at 314; 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 87 (1824) (“[t]he constitution gives nothing to the States or to the people. 
Their rights existed before it was formed, and are derived from the nature of sovereignty and the 
principles of freedom.”). See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). 
 132. Gostin, supra note 101, at 78, 121–26 (quoting Justice Harlan’s decision in Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, to say that “[t]he safety and the health of the people of Massachusetts are, in the first 
instance, for that Commonwealth to guard and protect. They are matters that do not ordinarily 
concern the National Government.”). 
 133. Wendy E. Parmet et al., Individual Rights Versus the Public’s Health100 Years After 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 352 New Eng. J. Med. 652, 653 (2005).  
 134. This power is typically invoked by a state to make decisions on behalf of those who cannot 
make decisions for themselves, or to justify the state’s more general interest in societal welfare and 
health. See Gostin, supra note 101, at 95–98.  
 135. Parmet, supra note 131, at 202.  
 136. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. For a more in-depth discussion of the federal enumerated powers 
relevant to public health, see Gostin, supra note 101, at 98–109; Parmet, supra note 131, at 203–07; 
Hodge, Jr., supra note 127, at 328–330; Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Theory and Practice in the 
Constitutional Design, 11 Health Matrix 265, 271–72 (2011); James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing 
Modern Public Health Goals Through Government: An Examination of New Federalism and Public 
Health Law, 14 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 93 (1997). 
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acted appropriately within their police powers.137 In short, the federal 
government can serve as a limiting factor to state public health 
regulation. 
The pendulum of power to regulate to promote the public’s health 
has swung between state and federal governments over the course of the 
twentieth century. First came the era of expansive state powers post-
Jacobson. Next, federal authority in the public health arena increased 
during the New Deal era when the Supreme Court broadened its 
interpretations of the commerce, taxing, and spending powers with 
national interests in mindevidencing the so-called “death” of 
federalism.138 Most recently, state powers have been newly invigorated by 
a series of cases that restrict federal power. Specifically, the Court has 
curtailed Congress’s power to “commandeer” the states to carry out 
federal programmatic objectives,139 and has limited the scope of the 
commerce power.140 Although national public health goals are unifying, 
they must be accomplished without infringing on state sovereignty.141 
 
 137. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). See Gostin, supra note 
101, at 80 (discussing the different types of federal preemption, including “express preemption,” where 
a federal statute explicitly declares that it preempts state or local law; and “implied preemption,” 
where Congress’s intent to supersede state or local law is clearly implied in legislative language or 
history. Implied preemption is further subdivided into two categories: (1) field preemption, whereby 
federal regulation is so encompassing as to dominate an entire field and leave no space for state or 
local action; and (2) conflict preemption, whereby compliance with state law would frustrate or make 
impossible compliance with federal law). Federal action in an area of public health regulation need not 
necessarily invalidate any state regulation, however. Federal laws often serve as a floor, above which 
state regulation can impose more stringent standards. See, e.g., Interim Final Rules Under the Paul 
Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 
5,410, 5,418, 5,430 (Feb. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 146). 
 138. Hodge, Jr., supra note 127, at 311–12 (quoting Joseph Lesser, The Course of Federalism in 
America, an Historical Overview, in Federalism: The Shifting Balance 11 (Janice C. Griffith ed., 
1987)).  
 139. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 142, 149 (1992) (striking down a “take title” 
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985, which 
required states to take ownership of and assume liability for waste if they did not dispose of 
radioactive wastes in a particular way); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) 
(ruling that Congress exceeded its powers by requiring in the Affordable Care Act that states expand 
Medicaid eligibility up to 133% of the federal poverty level in order to receive any Medicaid federal 
funds). But see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a federal law withholding five 
percent of federal highway funds from states that allowed people under twenty-one to buy alcoholic 
beverages). 
 140. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked the 
authority under the Commerce Powers, to make gun possession around schools under the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990 a federal criminal offense); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(finding that Congress lacked the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act under the 
Commerce Clause).  
 141. Hodge, Jr., supra note 127, at 356 (referring to this trend as signifying a “new federalism” era 
in which public health action must be balanced among federal and state levels of government). 
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Again, traditional state functions are central to the public’s health and 
thus enjoy significant legal protection from federal intrusion.142 
2. State and Federal Authority to Monitor Prescription Drugs 
Regulating controlled substances to prevent misuse and associated 
health and safety problems falls squarely within states’ police powers and 
their parens patriae powers to act as guardians for those unable to protect 
themselves, although the question of federal preemption arises as a 
potential limitation to that exercise. Several state attorneys general have 
successfully brought parens patriae lawsuits against Purdue Pharma, the 
maker of OxyContin, under negligent marketing and public nuisance 
theories to assert their state’s “quasi-sovereign” interests in the health, 
safety, and welfare of its citizens.143 State police power also has been 
exerted in numerous ways in the context of prescription opioid misuse, 
including via law enforcement activities to identify doctor shoppers, 
diverters, and high-volume prescribers, as well as through regulation of 
health care professionals involved in prescribing and dispensing.144 States 
have significantly expanded their legislative efforts in this area since the 
1970s, enacting myriad laws that have generally gone unchallenged as 
valid exercises of state police powers.145 Against this backdrop, there is 
little debate that PDMP general establishment falls squarely within the 
purview of state authority, to the extent PDMPs regulate the clinical 
practices of prescribing and dispensing of narcotic medicines. That said, 
and as discussed in Part II.A.4, PDMPs do raise certain privacy 
objections related to the storage and use of prescription data.146 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Richard C. Ausness, Symposium Article, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against 
Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. Va. L. Rev. 1117, 1146–56 (2014). 
 144. See Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954) (“It is elemental that a state has broad 
power to establish and enforce standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health of everyone 
there. . . . The state’s discretion in that field extends naturally to the regulation of all professions 
concerned with health.”). The authority of the states to regulate the practice of medicine is longstanding 
and extends to the field of narcotic prescribing. See Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the 
Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of 
Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 Annals Health L. 201, 201–23 (1999) 
(providing a history of the police power and the regulation of medical practice). 
 145. See Public Health Law Program: State Laws on Prescription Drug Misuse and Abuse, supra note 
100 and accompanying text. Certain states have sought to regulate the supply of a certain controlled 
substance, for example when Governor Deval Patrick of Massachusetts issued a public health 
emergency declaration that empowered the public health commissioner to use emergency powers to 
prohibit the prescribing and dispensing of hydrocodone-only medication (Zohydro, Zogenix), which 
had been recently approved by the FDA. This type of action, however, encroaches upon the federal 
government’s supreme role in drug safety approvalspecifically, the FDA’sand was found 
unconstitutional when challenged by Zogenix. See Rebecca Haffajee et al., What Is a Public Health 
“Emergency”?, 371 New Eng. J. Med. 986, 986–88 (2014). 
 146. See infra Part II.A.4.  
HAFFAJEE_19 (LANGONE) (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016 4:34 PM 
1648 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1621 
Although the states implement PDMPs with the requisite police 
power authority, the federal government possesses concurrent authority 
to regulate prescription drugs together with the states, a power derived 
from the Commerce Clause.147 Under the Commerce Power, the U.S. 
Congress may regulate: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the 
instrumentalities of commerce (including persons and things in interstate 
commerce); or (3) economic activities that have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.148 The Supreme Court has found narcotic drugs to 
satisfy all three prongs of this test, as they are “things” that flow through 
an interstate supply chain (from manufacturer to distributor to pharmacy 
to patient), the distribution of which impacts this interstate flow.149 
Congress’s regulation of controlled substances dates back to the 
early 1900s.150 But, it truly expanded with the enactment of the CSA in 
1970 and creation in 1973 of the DEA, an agency charged with policing the 
issuance and dispensing of controlled substances, including prescription 
drugs.151 To prescribe controlled substances in Schedules II through V, 
licensed prescribers must register with the DEA every three years and 
follow other administrative requirements.152 To avoid criminal liability 
under the CSA, a prescriber may issue controlled substance prescriptions 
only “for a legitimate medical purpose” when “acting in the usual course 
of his professional practice.”153 
 
 147. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 148. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).  
 149. See Michael C. Barnes & Gretchen Arndt, The Best of Both Worlds: Applying Federal 
Commerce and State Police Powers to Reduce Prescription Drug Abuse, 16 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 
271, 283–92 (2013) (describing in detail the Supreme Court’s application of the Commerce Power in 
the context of federal regulation of narcotics to advocate for national prescriber education to reduce 
prescription drug abuse).  
 150. See Shepherd, supra note 99, at 101. 
 151. See DEA Mission Statement, Drug Enf’t Admin., http://www.dea.gov/about/mission.shtml 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016). In addition, the federal government also established the FDA, which in 
2012 used its powers to require ER/LA opioid manufacturers to develop a REMS given that the 
potential risks of the drugs outweighed the benefits. The REMS policy requires these drug developers 
to manage the risk of accidental or intentional abuse and risks to patients who are prescribed the drugs 
but do not clinically need them, primarily by financing the education of prescribers and patients 
regarding opioid risks and proper prescribing, storage, and disposal practices. Valarie Blake, Fighting 
Prescription Drug Abuse with Federal and State Law, 15 Am. Med. Ass’n J. Ethics 443, 443–44 (2013). 
See generally John F. Peppin et al., Issues and Critiques of the Forthcoming Risk Evaluation and 
Mitigation Strategy (REMS) for Opioids in Pain Management, 27 Issues L. & Med. 91 (2011) 
(suggesting that REMS is unlikely to reduce the bulk of prescription drug abuse that occurs with non-
patients); Hilary Homenko, Rehabilitating Opioid Regulation: A Prescription for the FDA’s Next 
Proposal of an Opioid Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), 22 Health Matrix 273 
(2012). 
 152. 21 U.S.C. §§ 823, 827–29 (West 2012). See supra note 90 and accompanying text for a 
summary of the federal controlled substance Schedules.  
 153. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2013). Prescribers may also be held liable under certain state 
controlled substance acts for unauthorized prescribing practices.  
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Despite this expansive federal oversight of controlled substances 
and jurisprudence relating to the Commerce Power, the federal 
government has not chosen to use its Commerce Power to create any 
national prescription monitoring program or curtail state plenary powers 
to do so.154 Instead, it supports the states in monitoring prescription 
drugs, thereby lending additional support to the idea that Congress has 
little intention of preempting state PDMP creation. Specifically, the U.S. 
Department of Justice has encouraged state PDMPs by creating the 
Harold Rogers Prescription Drug Monitoring Program in 2002 to fund 
program creation, the National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws to 
help with policy coordination, and a Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Program Center of Excellence at Brandeis University to identify best 
practices.155 None of this federal activity would be construed as 
commandeering of the states, as the funds and support provided for 
PDMPs relate directly to these programs and do not require program 
establishment or operation.156 
The federal government, however, has not ceded this entire arena to 
the states. As a reciprocal gesture for its support for PDMPs, the federal 
government has elicited state cooperation with investigative activities 
relating to prescription drug misuse. The DEA has requested certain 
state PDMP data pursuant to administrative subpoenas, as authorized 
under the CSA, to investigate drug crimesan action that raised 
supremacy issues that ultimately went unresolved in Oregon Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Program v. United States DEA.157 In this case, the DEA 
was attempting to use its administrative subpoena power to access 
Oregon PDMP records for an individual patient and for all drugs 
prescribed by two physicians, absent a warrant.158 The Oregon PDMP 
refused to comply with these subpoenas on the basis that doing so would 
violate Oregon law, which says that PDMP data constitutes protected 
health information and law enforcement can only access the data 
 
 154. In other words, the federal government has neither expressly preempted state PDMPs nor 
enacted other controlled substance monitoring laws that would impliedly preempt state creation of 
PDMPs. See Barnes & Arndt, supra note 149, at 292–95 (discussing circuit court decisions that reaffirm 
the constitutionality of CSA regulations, but that have also found such regulations do not invalidate 
state police powers to regulate medicine).  
 155. Deyo et al., supra note 76, at 604–05.  
 156. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 142 (1992). 
 157. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. United States Drug Enf't Admin., 998 F. Supp. 2d 
957, 960 (D. Or. 2014). The DEA appealed the district court’s ruling and is awaiting a decision from the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The ultimate outcome of the case could influence the standards across 
jurisdictions regarding DEA (and state law enforcement) access to PDMP data. The CSA empowers the 
Attorney General, and executive agencies acting pursuant to his/her authority (including the DEA), with 
broad authority to issue administrative subpoenas for information “relevant or material” to an 
investigation relating to his/her functions “with respect to controlled substances.” 21 U.S.C. § 876(a) 
(West 2012).  
 158. See Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 960–61.  
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pursuant to a valid court order based on probable cause for an authorized 
drug-related investigation involving an individual.159 In a former instance 
when the Oregon PDMP objected to a DEA request for PDMP data 
(pursuant to an administrative subpoena) on all Schedule II through IV 
controlled substance prescriptions issued by a particular physician over a 
seven month period, a U.S. magistrate judge found Oregon’s court order 
requirement to be preempted by the CSA.160 In Oregon Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Program, the court never reached the supremacy issue 
presented, however, instead deciding that the DEA’s use of administrative 
subpoenas violated the Fourth Amendment, as discussed below in Part 
II.A.4. 
Given the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state governments 
to monitor prescription drugs, what is the appropriate balance of 
powersparticularly when presented with a complex and serious public 
health problem like prescription opioid misuse? Strong arguments can be 
made for federal intervention, given markedly heterogeneous programs 
across states, limited state resources, and the interstate components of 
drug prescribing and dispensing involved. State PDMPs exhibit widely 
varying features, most of which appear chaotically conceived and 
uninformed by rigorous studies of effectiveness (as most programs were 
adopted before much of an evidence base existed). State authorities may 
lack the resources or expertise to operationalize PDMPs optimally, even 
with federal assistance.161 Furthermore, prescription drug misuse is not 
confined within state borders, as demonstrated by growing evidence of 
doctor shopping across state lines162 and mail order pharmacies that can 
send controlled substances across states.163 All of these factors weigh in 
favor of uniform federal standards that could, in theory, more 
comprehensively and deliberately address prescription drug misuse.164 
While the federal government has the authority and a set of 
justifications to have its own PDMP, the creation of such a program 
would require a major overhaul of deeply entrenched state programs. 
State PDMPs represent huge investments; replacing them with a federal 
system would seem wasteful and counter-productive just as we are 
 
 159. Id.; Or. Rev. Stat. § 431.966(2)(a)(C) (West 2016).  
 160. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. United States Drug Enf't Admin., 998 F. Supp. 
2d 957, 960 (D. Or. 2014). In other words, the magistrate judge found the DEA’s investigatory 
authority reigned supreme over Oregon state law’s data access requirements. Id. 
 161. Clark et al., supra note 79, at 57–62; Gostin, supra note 101, at 81. 
 162. See, e.g., Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth E. Carlson, The Ecology of Prescription Opioid 
Abuse in the USA: Geographic Variation in Patients’ Use of Multiple Prescribers (“Doctor Shopping”), 
23 Pharmacoepidemiology & Drug Safety 1258 (2014) (estimating that thirty percent of doctor 
shoppers obtained prescriptions across state lines); Ken Lammers, Jr., Rise of the Pills, 15 UDCDCSL 
L. Rev. 91, 102 (2011) (providing anecdotal evidence of doctor shopping across state lines).  
 163. See Anupam B. Jena et al., Prescription Medication Abuse and Illegitimate Internet-Based 
Pharmacies, 155 Annals Internal Med. 848 (2011).  
 164. Gostin, supra note 101, at 81; Parmet, supra note 131, at 208.  
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beginning to detect what may be promising health results.165 State 
governments (and local governments to which they may delegate power) 
are closer to the issues and have more flexibility than the federal 
government to cater the programs to their citizenry’s public health needs, 
opinions, and geographiesall of which can serve to enhance PDMP 
results.166 Certain states may wish to implement specific features or 
PDMPs in combination with other interventions for a greater impact. For 
example, Florida chose to combine a PDMP with regulation of pill mills, 
given the high concentration of these practices.167 States can also function 
as “laboratories” to test new interventions and inform evidence-based 
policy in other jurisdictions.168 The progressive, widespread adoption of 
PDMPs from the 1990s through 2000s provides rich heterogeneity in 
programs across states to allow for natural experiments that test different 
features for the best results. In sum, leaving state PDMPs intact for 
continued evaluation and potentially improvement seems preferable. As 
a stronger evidence base about effective PDMP practices emerges, there 
will be room for increased federal influence to achieve some consistency 
across programs: The federal government should condition future state 
PDMP funding on adoption of these identified practices.169 But at the 
moment, while states seem to be an appropriate level at which to 
implement PDMPs, policymakers face tough decisions with respect to 
the form that these laws take, as guided by consideration of individual 
liberties, effectiveness, and other ethical dimensions. 
3. Constitutional Limits on Public Health Regulation 
Although state governments have broad authority to act in ways that 
limit private interests in favor of the greater community,170 these 
infringements do have legal bounds. Individual liberty, autonomy, privacy, 
and economic freedom enjoy protection from certain government 
 
 165. See infra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the PDMP effectiveness literature.  
 166. See Gostin, supra note 101, at 81; Hodge, Jr., supra note 127, at 356.  
 167. See, e.g., Lainie Rutkow et al., Effect of Florida’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program and 
Pill Mill Laws on Opioid Prescribing and Use, 10 JAMA Internal Med. 1642 (2015) (finding that 
Florida’s PDMP and pill mill laws were associated with modest decreases in total opioid volume 
supplied, as well as in morphine milligram equivalents per transaction and opioid prescriptions). 
 168. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 654, 671–79 (discussing that state-based law provides the 
opportunity for evaluation thanks to time-varying adoption of reform across jurisdictions, often for 
reasons unrelated to the outcome variable of interest. The federal National Minimum Drinking Age 
Act, which tied the minimum drinking age to national highway funds, was adopted after studies of 
state innovations attributed beneficial health impacts to higher drinking ages).  
 169. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 170. Parmet, supra note 109, at 401–11 (discussing the interdependency of health and the public 
good nature of many interventions as justifications for public health interventions, such as the 
individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act).  
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intrusion under the Bill of Rights, as well as state constitutions and laws.171 
In addition to articulating the breadth of state authority to protect the 
public’s health, Jacobson was the first case to carefully articulate a 
framework for the protection of individual liberties in the exercise of 
police power, which has been elaborated upon and developed in 
subsequent case law interpreting the Constitution.172 The permissibility of 
public health laws turns on scientific justification and the manner in which 
they are applied.173 Specifically, public health powers are constitutional 
only if exercised in accordance with the following legal principles: (1) 
extraterritoriality; (2) necessity; (3) reasonableness; (4) due process rights; 
and (5) equal protection principles.174 Freedom of expression principles 
further impose significant barriers to public health regulation. For general 
framing purposes, the above principles are outlined in brief and then 
applied in detail as relevant to PDMPs. 
For any given public health law, state policymakers should undertake 
a careful constitutional analysis to anticipate private objections that could 
frustrate implementation. First, states can regulate matters within their 
borders, but not extraterritorially.175 Second, the exercise of police power 
should be necessary to prevent an actual or looming threat to public 
health, rather than a potential or hypothetical one.176 Third, the exercise of 
state power must be reasonable. Here a policymaker would ask two 
questions: (1) will the legal action taken plausibly be effective in achieving 
its objective (that is, are the means reasonably related to the ends)?; and 
(2) are there any obviously less burdensome alternatives that could have 
been implemented instead?177 
Furthermore, individual rights to due process and equal protection 
are constitutionally protected and must be considered in the affirmative 
 
 171. Gostin, supra note 101, at 85–86, 114–16. State constitutions and laws also provide parameters 
for policymaker actions, but are too plentiful to be addressed comprehensively in this Article.  
 172. See generally Wendy K. Mariner et al., Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-Great-
Grandfather’s Public Health Law, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health 581 (2005) (tracing the evolution of 
conceptions of state police powers and individual liberty over the century since Jacobson, finding that 
the Court’s recognition of the relative importance of liberty has strengthened over time).  
 173. Parmet et al., supra note 133, at 654.  
 174. Although the facts in Jacobson did not require the Supreme Court to articulate equal 
protection as a constitutionally required limitation, this standard had previously been articulated in 
Jew Ho v. Williamson. Gostin, supra note 101, at 128 (citing Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (N.D. 
Cal. 1900)). 
 175. The police power is a state’s “recognized [] authority [] to enact . . . all laws that relate to 
matters completely within its territory and which do not by their necessary operation affect the people 
of other states.” Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). 
 176. Gostin, supra note 101, at 126–27 (the subject of compulsory intervention must pose an 
actual, demonstrable threat to the community); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (not requiring that the 
vaccination be administered against anyone who “with reasonable certainty” can show that he is not 
the “fit subject of vaccination . . . by reason of his then condition, [which] would seriously impair his 
health or probably cause his death.”). 
 177. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31; Gostin, supra note 101, at 127.  
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government exercise of public health powers. Individuals are free from 
unwanted intrusionsincluding searches and seizuresin places in 
which they have a legitimate expectation of privacy (such as their body 
or property).178 Under the Fourth Amendment, a search is usually found 
unreasonable absent a warrant from a judge showing probable cause,179 
with limited exceptions.180 The concept of liberty is also protected under 
the Fifth Amendment181 and can be framed as two separate obligations: 
procedural due process and substantive due process. Procedural due 
process entitles individuals to fair procedurestypically, notice, a fair 
hearing, and counsel182when the government deprives them of life, 
liberty, or property.183 Substantive due process relates to the protected 
zone of individual liberty or privacy, where the government cannot enter 
without adequate justification.184 And finally, any state government-
drawn distinction between similarly situated personsfor example, 
 
 178. Gostin, supra note 101, at 403. The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,” 
and is extended to state governments via the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV. See 
Wilson v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cty., 620 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that health 
official searches absent warrants or consent violated individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
 179. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (holding that a housing inspection of 
an apartment was a violation of the Fourth Amendment absent a warrant or consent); See v. City of 
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (finding the fire inspection of a business to be unconstitutional 
without a warrant or consent).  
 180. Gostin, supra note 101, at 403–04, 468–69. If obtaining a warrant is impractical, the courts will 
conduct an individualized assessment using reasonableness standardsprobing the importance of the 
state interest, the degree of privacy invasion, and whether the state had a reasonable suspicion or 
special need. Id. at 403–04. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (holding that drug 
testing high school students participating in extracurricular activities is reasonable given the important 
state interests in protecting children’s health, the minimal intrusion associated with urine testing, and 
the reduced expectation of privacy that schoolchildren possess). A special need must be something 
aside from merely enforcing laws, although this standard has been interpreted more generously over 
time. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (finding that state hospital 
performance of urine tests on pregnant women without their consent to obtain evidence for law 
enforcement purposes constituted an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. No 
special need was recognized given that the testing was linked to the state’s general interest in law 
enforcement.); Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P. 2d 1200, 1230 (1997) (striking down mandatory drug 
tests for all city employees seeking promotions because they had already been tested, whereas drug 
tests for new applicants were permissible given the lack of prior knowledge of their drug use). 
 181. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “No person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment 
has been extended to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
 182. See, e.g., Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1980) (holding that people with communicable 
tuberculosis must be afforded counsel, written notice, and the right to confront the witnesses against 
them). 
 183. Gostin, supra note 101, at 132. 
 184. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (finding a liberty right to engage in 
private acts, particularly intimate acts in nonpublic locations, such as the home). 
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between persons of different races and ethnicities185requires 
justification based on equal protection principles.186 The level of scrutiny 
applied by courts in considering substantive due process and equal 
protection claims varies depending on the nature of the burdened right 
or interest.187 
Although not raised in Jacobson or yet in the context of PDMPs, 
freedom of speech is relevant to the evaluative framework and policymaking 
calculus in other public health law contexts, such as regulating the 
advertising of tobacco products. State regulators should be mindful that 
courts afford exceptional protection to speech, and the trend has been 
toward increasing protection of commercial speech, in particular.188 Indeed, 
the First Amendment is, of late, arguably the most significant constitutional 
barrier to state and federal public health regulation in the contexts of both 
compelled speech and speech restrictions.189 
4. Liberty Issues Raised by PDMPs 
Although states are generally within the purview of their police 
powers in creating PDMPs, certain features of these heterogeneous 
programs have the potential to infringe upon individual rights and 
freedoms and may, therefore, be subject to legal challenge. PDMPs, as 
typically implemented, meet the extraterritoriality and necessity 
 
 185. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 372 (1886) (striking down a facially neutral 
ordinance restricting the washing of clothes in public laundromats after 10:00 p.m. on the basis that it 
was being enforced with discriminatory intentonly against Chinese owners); Jew Ho v. Williamson, 
103 F. 10, 26 (N.D. Cal. 1900) (finding that the quarantine of an entire district in San Francisco in 
order to contain a bubonic plague epidemic was used as a guise to discriminate against Chinese people 
who populated most of the area, the health of whom was actually placed at greater risk by the 
quarantine).  
 186. The Fourteenth Amendment also provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amdt. XIV. 
 187. For further discussion of substantive due process, equal protection, and levels of constitutional 
review, see Gostin, supra note 101, at 135–42.  
 188. Id.; see, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 554–55 (2011) (finding that a Vermont state 
statute banning the sale, use, or transmission of prescriber-identifiable data (absent prescriber consent) 
violated data miner free speech rights); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376–77 (2002) 
(holding that a provision of the FDA Modernization Act, which exempts certain compounded drugs from 
having to satisfy drug approval requirements if the drug is not advertised or promoted, unconstitutionally 
restricts pharmacists’ commercial speech); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555–56 (2001) 
(holding that Massachusetts’ outdoor and point-of-sale advertising restrictions targeting smokeless 
tobacco and cigars violated the First Amendment); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 
696 F.3d 1205, 1221–22  (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that the FDA rule requiring graphic warning images on 
cigarette packages and advertisements violates the First Amendment). 
 189. For academic discussion of this evolving and expansive body of law, see David Orentlicher, The 
Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health Regulation: The Clash Between the Public Interest in a Robust First 
Amendment and the Public Interest in Effective Protection from Harm, 37 Am. J.L. & Med. 299 (2011); 
Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 Geo. L.J. 497 (2015). 
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requirements for public health laws originally articulated in Jacobson.190 
Each program operates within its state’s borders, collecting data on 
controlled substances dispensed within the state and permitting prescriber, 
pharmacist, and sometimes regulator use of that data.191 Some interstate 
sharing of information to authorized users (typically, prescribers or 
pharmacists) or PDMPs in other states occurs,192 but any information 
transmitted across state boundaries is usually shared reciprocally, subject 
to the originating state’s requirements for authorized use, and intended to 
complement public health efforts in both states. Furthermore, sharing of 
data across state lines can be justified given the sometimes interstate 
nature of prescribing, drug fills, and diversion.193 With regard to necessity, 
there is little debate that the exercise of police power is necessary to 
address opioid misuse and overdose, a public health threat of significant 
and increasing magnitude.194 
Further, the programs appear reasonable in the Jacobson sense of 
the term.195 PDMPs bear a real and substantial relation to the protection of 
public health and safety: They aim to inform optimal prescribing as well as 
to address patients and prescribers with outlier fill and prescribing 
patterns, respectively. Given that the vast majority of drugs misused 
originate from prescribers, either directly or indirectly,196 prescribing is a 
reasonable level at which to intervene to address the epidemic. Also, 
because a small percentage of prescribers source the majority of opioids, 
and because a small percentage of patients receive disproportionately 
large amounts of opioids,197 outliers in each of these categories are 
reasonable targets for intervention. If challenged, a court would likely 
view a state’s decision to implement a PDMP in lieu of or in addition to 
other available interventions that target prescription drug misuse (such as 
pain clinic laws198) with deference, finding it neither arbitrary nor totally 
unreasonable. 
 
 190. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) for a definition of states’ “police 
power.” See supra note 175 of this Article for such a definition.   
 191. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 4. 
 192. Interstate Sharing of Prescription Monitoring Database Information, Nat’l All. for Model 
State Drug Laws (2014), http://www.namsdl.org/library/BCC76DA9-E7E5-7D40-AE816BB3141687D7/ 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Gostin, supra note101, and text accompanying note 176; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 
U.S. 11 (1905); see also Part I, supra for a discussion of the public health significance of opioid misuse.  
 195. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.  
 196. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.  
 197. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Addressing Prescription Drug Abuse in the 
United States: Current Activities and Future Opportunities 15–17 (2013). 
 198. Laws that regulate “pill mills,” or pain management clinics that source large quantities of 
prescriptions, aim to prevent these facilities from inappropriately prescribing controlled substances. Such 
laws typically provide for state oversight of pill mills and contain other requirements pertaining to ownership 
and operation of the facility. For instance, a law may set forth personnel and operational requirements, 
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The heart of challenges to PDMPs revolves around informational 
privacy rights. These rights can be located in the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, as well as in federal and state confidentiality laws. Because 
statewide prescription dispensing data is aggregated in a database that 
can be widely accessed by many types of authorized users, PDMPs 
present new possibilities for security breaches in which private 
information is disclosed to the general public, as well as for law 
enforcement and licensing body use of the data. The potential for broad 
data access raises privacy concerns among patients and prescribers and 
could reduce their drug seeking and prescribing behaviors, respectively. 
Some such behavior changes may be desirable, given that a central 
purpose of PDMPs is to have a deterrent effect on over-prescribing, 
doctor shopping, and diversion. But other behavioral changes may be 
unintended199 and undesirable, such as the chilling of appropriate 
prescribing or patient access to legitimately needed painkillers. Courts 
seek to balance the competing state and individual privacy interests in 
determining the legality of PDMPs and access to prescription 
information contained therein. 
The Supreme Court addressed the right to informational privacy in 
prescription records under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Whalen v. Roe.200 In Whalen, the Court considered 
whether New York’s paper prescription monitoring program (which also 
collected the prescription information in a computerized database) 
violated individual interests in (1) avoiding disclosure of personal matters, 
and/or (2) independence in important decisionmaking.201 The Court 
admitted that the monitoring program could have a chilling effect on 
opioid prescribing and use. Nonetheless, it found that the program 
adequately safeguarded physicians’ and patients’ right to informational 
privacy, emphasizing the extensive security protections in place to keep 
private information from being disclosed and the fact that the decision 
whether to prescribe or use a drug is still left to patients and doctors.202 
Subsequent state courts have considered the right to informational 
privacy in prescription records housed in individual pharmacies, rather 
than statewide databases, and relied on the Whalen precedent to find no 
 
inspection and licensure procedures, standards of care, and/or patient billing procedures. See Ctrs. for 
Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 66. 
 199. See infra Parts II.B–C for additional consideration of unintended consequences of PDMPs 
under the evaluative framework. 
 200. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).  
 201. Id. at 591, 599–600.  
 202. Id. at 600–02, 604 (noting protections, including a receiving room protected by a locked wire 
fence and alarm system, limited access to a small number of people, and serious penalties for unlawful 
release). The Court also found that any physician claim regarding potential disclosure of patient 
information was “derivative from, and therefore no stronger than, the patients’”in other words, 
rejecting physician privacy rights violations in this context. Id. at 604.  
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constitutional violations.203 Although not yet squarely addressed by any 
court, it seems unlikely an electronic PDMP would infringe upon 
Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights if adequate safeguards were in 
place to protect the data from public disclosure.204 
Patient (and prescriber) Fourth Amendment privacy rights are also 
implicated by warrantless searches of PDMP data by law enforcement 
officials and other regulators. In almost all states, professional licensing 
bodies and law enforcement officials can access PDMP data for the 
respective purpose of conducting administrative searches and pursuing 
criminal investigations against patients, prescribers, or pharmacists.205 
What differs from state to state is whether these officials can access the 
data simply pursuant to an active investigation, or whether they need to 
satisfy the more stringent standards of accessing the information only 
with a court-issued search warrant, subpoena, or order.206 While the 
stated goals of PDMPs varyand many programs explicitly do aim to 
prevent criminal activities such as diversion and doctor shopping207a 
common primary goal is to improve health care by reducing drug misuse 
and facilitating appropriate prescribing.208 If law enforcement and 
licensing officials are given access to the files absent any probable cause 
or reasonable restrictions around terms of access, PDMPs could easily 
turn into tools primarily used to troll for criminal or medical misconduct. 
This shift in emphasis could induce a chilling effect on prescribing and 
prescription drug use in ways that actually interfere with optimal medical 
care. 
The Whalen Court did not decide whether a centralized state 
database housing prescription records implicates the Fourth Amendment 
 
 203. See, e.g., State v. Wiedeman, 835 N.W.2d 698, 714 (Neb. 2013) (finding no violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment after “weighing the State’s significant interest in the regulation of potentially 
dangerous and addictive narcotic drugs against the minimal interference with one’s ability to make 
medical decisions and the protections from broader dissemination to the general public”); Stone v. 
City of Snow, 593 N.E.2d 294, 301 (Ohio 1992) (holding that the Ohio statutes permitting warrantless 
inspection of prescriptions, orders, and records to law enforcement officials and regulators did not 
violate doctor, patient, or pharmacist rights to privacy as they did not allow disclosure to the general 
public and included adequate safeguards).  
 204. In a Whalen v. Roe concurrence, Justice Brennan did express concerns with the computerized 
storage of sensitive information, leaving open the possibility that the Court would view electronic 
PDMPs, whereby data are shared across a wide network of authorized users, as a heightened invasion of 
privacy. David B. Brushwood, Maximizing the Value of Electronic Prescription Monitoring Programs, 
31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 41, 43 (2003). But see Dilcher, supra note 40 (suggesting it is unlikely that the 
Supreme Court will invalidate electronic PDMPs on general privacy grounds).  
 205. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 5, 25–26. In a handful of states, 
the PDMP is actually housed within a law enforcement or professional licensing agency, as opposed to 
a health agency, thereby giving these regulators and officials’ unfettered access to the records. Id. at 
25–26.  
 206. Id. 
 207. Corey S. Davis et al., Overdose Epidemic, Prescription Monitoring Programs, and Public 
Health: A Review of State Laws, 105 Am. J. Pub. Health e9, e9–e10 (2015).  
 208. Id. 
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right to privacy.209 However, other state and federal courts have addressed 
this right in the context of pharmacy-housed prescription records, 
generally finding that although patients have a subjective expectation of 
privacy in their prescription records, they do not have a privacy right that 
society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable210as is also 
required to invoke Fourth Amendment protections.211 Some courts have 
justified patients’ (and prescribers’) reduced expectation of privacy in 
pharmacy records on the basis that most states have laws that explicitly 
allow certain officials access to these records without a warrant.212 Other 
courts have recognized pharmaceuticals as a pervasively regulated 
industry213 and thus applied the three-pronged test set out in New York v. 
Burger to determine whether a warrantless search is reasonable.214 In 
applying the Burger test, courts have typically found that allowing 
searches of prescription data furthers substantial and well-established 
government interests in regulating prescription drugs, and that notice 
requirements are met if these searches are conducted during reasonable 
hours.215 Most courts have found the warrant exception applies to 
administrative inspections of pharmacy records, such as those conducted 
by pharmacy boards, though some also have applied it to searches 
conducted pursuant to criminal investigations.216 
 
 209. The Court declined to address the Fourth Amendment arguments brought by physician and 
patient plaintiffs because the case did not “involve affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused 
intrusions into individual privacy during the course of criminal investigations.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 
U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977).  
 210. See, e.g., State v. Wiedeman, 835 N.W.2d 698, 710–11 (Neb. 2013); State v. Russo, 790 A.2d 
1132, 1152 (Conn. 2002); Stone v. City of Snow, 593 N.E.2d 294, 300–01 (Ohio 1992). 
 211. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 212. See Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. State, 62 P.3d 533, 536 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Underwood, No. K2/98-0485A, 1999 WL 47159, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 20, 1999);  Gettel v. State, 449 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). See Russo, 790 A.2d at 
1141. See Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, Prescription Monitoring Programs, Pharmacy 
Records and the Right to Privacy 21–37 (2014) (providing a catalogue of these pharmacy records 
access laws). 
 213. In its close level of regulation, the pharmaceutical industry is distinguishable from certain 
other areas of health. See, e.g., Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d. 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that an Arizona regulation that required abortion clinics to submit to warrantless inspections 
by the Arizona Department of Human Services violated the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit 
determined that the administrative search exception was inapplicable because abortion services are 
not a closely regulated business). 
 214. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). To determine whether a warrantless search is 
reasonable, three criteria must be met: (1) there must be a substantial government interest in 
regulating this area; (2) the regulatory scheme must further that government interest; and (3) the 
regulation must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrantin other words, it must 
provide comprehensive notice to the target of the search and appropriately limit the time, place, and 
scope of the search. Id. at 702.  
 215. See Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682, 683–85 (2d Cir. 1974); State v. Welch, 624 A.2d 
1105, 1110–12 (Vt. 1992);  Stone, 593 N.E.2d at 300–01. 
 216. State v. Jarvis, No. 16388, 1998 WL 57342, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1998) (finding that 
inspectors were not required to ignore evidence of criminality discovered during a warrantless 
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PDMPs, however, raise unique issues with respect to unfettered 
searches, particularly when conducted by law enforcement or licensing 
officials, which justify different data access standards from those applied 
to pharmacy-housed records. PDMPs centralize all dispensing data 
generated within a state (and sometimes across states), rather than that 
from a single pharmacy. Most are fully electronic and searchable, for 
instance by prescriber, pharmacy, or patient nameor conceivably by 
controlled substance or prescribing volume. Under the mosaic theory, 
the aggregation of prescription information in PDMPs should be covered 
by a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, 
even if each individual pharmacy-housed record may not be.217 Moreover, 
although the third-party doctrine suggests that when certain records are 
turned over and maintained by third-parties, they are no longer private 
and not protected by the Fourth Amendment when exposed to others, 
significant support for patients’ expectation of privacy in medical records 
exists.218 Because PDMP data, by virtue of their comprehensive nature, 
are akin to medical records, there is a strong argument that such records 
are entitled to some measure of protection from unfettered access by 
government officials. 
Indeed, the heightened Fourth Amendment privacy concerns 
associated with PDMPs were recognized in Oregon Prescription Drug 
Monitoring. In this leading case in the area, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”) intervened on behalf of the PDMP to raise arguments 
about individual physician and patient Fourth Amendment privacy rights 
 
administrative search conducted with independent administrative justification); Welch, 624 A.2d at 1112; 
Stone, 593 N.E.2d at 300–01. See State v. Desper, 783 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (finding that once 
a search ceases to be administrative in nature and a criminal investigation commenced, a warrant was 
required); State v. Penn, 576 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio 1991) (upholding lower court’s grant of a motion to 
suppress evidence uncovered during a joint inspection by the state pharmacy board and the police, given 
that the search was undertaken for general criminal purposes, stating that, the “board cannot act as a 
surrogate for the police to obviate the constitutional duty of obtaining a search warrant.”). But see Penn, 
576 N.E.2d at 723; Commonwealth v. Frodyma, 436 N.E.2d 925 (Mass. 1982) (refusing to extend the 
warrant exception to criminal investigations).  
 217. See Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers and Three Questions After United States v. Jones 
(2012), the Fourth Amendment “GPS Case”, 19–28 (Mar. 28, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2030390 (noting five Justices’ express support for the “mosaic theory” in U.S. 
v. Jones, or the idea that the aggregation of information may be covered by a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, even though each discrete piece of information standing alone would not. The mosaic 
theory, which suggests the Fourth Amendment protection can be triggered when the sheer quantity of 
information becomes great, applies both to information presented to the public and that turned over 
to a third-party, like PDMP data. However, the precise parameters of how this theory will be applied 
by the Court remain uncertain). For additional arguments in favor of the mosaic theory, see Wayne A. 
Logan, “Mosaic Theory” and Megan’s Laws, 2011 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 95 (2011).  
 218. See, e.g., State v. Skinner, 10 So. 3d 1212, 1218 (La. 2009) (finding that the Fourth Amendment 
requires a search warrant before a search of medical or prescription records for criminal investigative 
purposes can be undertaken); Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a 
patient at a methadone clinic had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the records on file there, given 
their intimate and private nature).  
HAFFAJEE_19 (LANGONE) (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016 4:34 PM 
1660 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1621 
in their PDMP information. Notwithstanding federalism issues discussed 
above in Part II.A.2, the federal district court decided in favor of the 
ACLU and held that the Fourth Amendment was violated by the DEA’s 
use of administrative subpoenas (rather than a court-issued warrant) to 
obtain PDMP records for an individual patient’s prescriptions and for all 
drugs prescribed by two physicians.219 The court found that both patients 
and physicians have subjective and objective expectations of privacy in 
PDMP records for the Schedule II through IV drugs at issue.220 The court 
found that although patients must expect that medical personnel will 
access their prescription files, it is reasonable for patients to expect that 
law enforcement will not have access to the PDMP recordsgiven the 
intensely personal nature of the data (often revealing a person’s medical 
condition and treatment patterns) and information on the PDMP’s website 
that emphasized the protection of confidential information.221Although the 
district court’s decision is not binding in other jurisdictions and a few 
state courts have held alternately,222 PDMPs are beginning to follow 
Oregon Prescription Drug Monitoring guidance by increasingly requiring 
 
 219. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. United States Drug Enf't Admin., 998 F. Supp. 
2d 957, 960, 967(D. Or. 2014). 
 220. Id. at 964–67. 
 221. Id. at 966–67. The district court found it “difficult to conceive of information that is more 
private or more deserving of Fourth Amendment protection” than prescription drug information that 
would reveal if a patient is being treated for gender identity disorderas would be captured by PDMP 
records. Prescribing records of this kind are protected against government intrusion by a “heightened 
privacy interest rendering the use of administrative subpoenas unreasonable.” Id. The court also 
dispensed with the DEA’s assertion that the “third-party doctrine” undermines the patient/prescriber 
expectations of privacy because (1) PDMP records are inherently personal and private; and (2) doctors 
and patients do not voluntarily convey the information to the PDMPrather it is required by law that 
all dispensing information be included. Id.  
 222. Williams v. Commonwealth, 213 S.W.3d 671, 676–78 (Ky. 2006) (finding that the Kentucky 
statute authorizing warrantless searches of PDMP data is facially constitutional and does not amount to a 
“search,” because only limited data of Schedules II-V controlled substances that did not reveal a patient’s 
medical condition or treatment were conveyed); Lambert v. Larizza, Case No. 13-314-2-CICI (Fla. Cir. 
Ct. Feb. 13, 2014) (holding that the production of PDMP prescription records for 3300 patients to state 
and federal law enforcement officials pursuant to a warrantless request did not violate Florida’s 
constitution because there is a reduced expectation of privacy in prescription records); Florida Judge 
Rules Government Can Search Prescription Drug Monitoring Database, Thomson Reuters (Feb. 21, 
2014), http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/practice-of-law/florida-judge-rules-government-can-
search-prescription-drugmonitoring-database/ (discussing the ruling in Lambert v. Larizza). See Jodie 
Tillman, California High Court to Consider Limits on Regulators’ Access to Prescription Database, L.A. 
Daily News (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20150426/california-high-court-to-
consider-limits-on-regulators-access-to-prescription-database (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (describing the 
decision of a California state appeals court that found medical board use of PDMP data to identify a 
physician with outlier prescribing trends that led to his administrative probation does not violate the 
patients’ rights to privacy under the state constitution. The court found that medical records are not 
comparable to prescription records from a privacy standpoint, as the latter are subject to regular scrutiny 
by law enforcement and regulatory agencies). 
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a search warrant or a court-issued subpoena for law enforcement officials 
to access PDMP data.223 
Privacy protections for PDMP data can also be located in non-
constitutional sources, such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) and state privacy laws.224 The HIPAA 
“Privacy Rule” creates a national standard for the protection of 
individually identifiable health care information from disclosure by 
“covered entities” (or health care providers), with limited exceptions that 
may apply to PDMP data.225 For example, a covered entity may disclose 
health information that identifies a patient without receiving permission 
from that individual for enumerated exceptions germane to PDMPs, 
including: disclosures required by law; public health activities; health 
oversight activities; law enforcement purposes; and for treatment, 
payments, and health care operations.226 Moreover, HIPAA does not 
preempt state law (including state privacy and PDMP laws) if the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services determines that the state 
provision serves a compelling public health need or has as its principal 
purpose the regulation of any controlled substance, among other aims.227 
All of this suggests that HIPAA should not prevent the sharing of 
information via PDMPseither by dispensers when initially logged into 
the PDMP or to authorized users of PDMPsso long as the information 
shared is limited to the minimum necessary to achieve the intended 
purpose.228 
 
 223. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 2; Devon T. Unger, Minding 
Your Meds: Balancing the Needs for Patient Privacy and Law Enforcement in Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs, 117 W. Va. L. Rev. 345, 386 (2014) (arguing that patients have a legitimate 
interest in personally identifiable PDMP data and that the Fourth Amendment requires law 
enforcement to obtain a warrant before accessing such data). Still, thirty states allow law enforcement 
to conduct searches of PDMP data merely pursuant to an active investigation, and many allow 
licensing boards to do the same. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 25–26.  
 224. Unger, supra note 223, at 362–64. 
 225. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2012). “Covered entities” include medical or health care service 
providers, such as physicians and pharmacists, who electronically transmit individually identifiable 
information in connection with financial or administrative activities related to health care. 
Id. §§ 164.501, 164.506, 164.512.  
 226. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501, 164.506, 164.512 (2012).  
 227. HIPAA does not preempt state law (including a PDMP law) if the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services determines that the provision serves a compelling public health need, or has “as its principal purpose 
the regulation of the manufacture, registration, distribution, dispensing, or other control of any controlled 
substance;” or “provides for the reporting of disease or injury . . . or for the conduct of public health 
surveillance, investigation, or intervention.” 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.203(a)(1)–(2), 160.203(c). See Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule and Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs 
(PMPs), Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws (2010), http://www.namsdl.org/library/BB52D3BB-1372-
636CDD90AC3AAB8D724F/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 228. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1). At least one federal lawsuit charges that access by a local police 
department of a man’s prescription history without probable cause, a subpoena, or court order is a violation 
of HIPAA. Mollie Bryant, Brandon Denies Police Violated HIPAA, The Clarion-Ledger (Jan. 25, 2016), 
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Moreover, some states include explicit privacy protections in their 
PDMP laws. These steps are advisable for all programs and include: 
exempting PDMP data from public records requests;229 imposing criminal 
or civil penalties for unauthorized disclosure of PDMP data;230 limiting 
authorized users of the data to a select set of professionals; and explicitly 
requiring that the housing entity comply with all relevant state and 
federal privacy and confidentiality laws.231 States should also put in place 
substantial data security protections to avoid disclosure of PDMP 
information, especially if data is shared across state lines. These 
measures include password-protected access (and careful authentication 
of all users), data encryption software, preventing unauthorized 
downloads of the data, and monitoring for potential security breaches. 
While some states set forth stricter conditions for law enforcement 
and licensing official access PDMP files, as compared to pharmacy-
housed files, the majority still allow warrantless searches.232 The Oregon 
Prescription Drug Monitoring decision to require law enforcement 
officials to obtain a warrant based on probable cause strikes a reasonable 
balance between facilitating federal and state law enforcement drug 
investigations and protecting physician-patient interests and medical 
privacy. These data access requirements should also be extended to 
licensing bodies given their analogous role to law enforcement and 
ability to sanction medical professionals by revoking or suspending 
medical licenses. Otherwise, unfettered access to prescription records by 
law enforcement and licensing officials runs a higher risk of hampering 
prescribing and/or opioid use to an extent that compromises legitimate 
pain management. State rules that require the data be housed within a 
health agency and limit PDMP authorized users to those who use the 
data for clinical purposesand provide the data (absent a warrant) to 
others (such as researchers, law enforcement, or licensing bodies) only 
on a de-identified basisrun the least risk of running afoul of privacy 
laws or interfering with the doctor-patient relationship. Moreover, 
requiring law enforcement and licensing bodies to obtain a warrant does 
not substantially interfere with their duties and is therefore reasonable.233 
 
http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2016/01/25/brandon-denies-bpd-violated-hipaa/79313188/ (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 229. Thirty-one states currently exempt PDMP data from public records laws. Nat’l All. for 
Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 41.  
 230. Thirty-eight states currently have such penalties for disclosing or obtaining PDMP data 
without authorization. Id. at 42. However, enforcement of these penalties is not well-documented.  
 231. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68; Unger, supra note 223, at 379–82 
(proposing that all data be personally de-identified before disclosure to law enforcement officials).  
 232. See Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 22–37; Nat’l All. for Model 
State Drug Laws,  Types of Authorized RecipientsProfessional Licensing or Regulatory Boards 
(2014). 
 233. See People v. Curco Drugs, Inc., 350 N.Y.S.2d 74, 84 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1973) (“[O]btaining of a 
warrant would not have seriously undermined the [statute allowing administrative inspections of 
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In summary, states seem to be the appropriate level for PDMP 
implementation and a federal PDMP is neither a realistic option on the 
horizon nor a necessary one. However, certain features of state PDMPs 
can infringe upon protected individual rights and should be carefully 
considered going forward. Given the potential for broad PDMP data 
access that could hinder optimal medical care by affecting doctor and 
patient behavior around opioid prescribing and drug seeking, PDMPs 
should be guarded carefully by the housing entity and available to a 
limited subset of users under select circumstances. Most notably, law 
enforcement and licensing officials should only obtain the data pursuant 
to a warrant based on probable cause. Penalties for unauthorized data 
disclosure should be clear, strong, and enforced. 
B. Effectiveness of Regulation 
Even if a PDMP seems likely to withstand privacy challenges, 
policymakers must further inquire into the effectiveness of a particular 
approach. This second consideration with respect to public health laws is 
empirical in nature: Will (or does) the regulation in questioneither 
proposed or already implementedeffectively address the immediate 
public health threat? State regulators should specifically ask: (1) what are 
the public health outcomes this law seeks to impact?; (2) do these 
outcomes align with pre-defined primary and secondary health outcomes 
we seek to target?; (3) does sufficient, credible evidence exist to suggest 
that the law will achieve (or has achieved) intended public health 
outcomes when applied to the context and environment at hand?; and (4) 
Is the predicted or actual ratio of intended to unintended consequences 
high enough to warrant implementation? 
This Article considers public health laws that are “interventional” in 
nature, meaning those that are intended to either directly affect health 
outcomes, or to impact health via mediating factors (such as health 
behaviors or environments) in the causal chain between laws and health 
outcomes.234 Interventional laws are central to answering the question at 
the core of public health lawmaking: “What are the best legal tools to use 
to promote health?”235 Nevertheless, many other types of public health 
laws, such as those of infrastructural and incidental natures, are critical to 
 
pharmacy premises without a warrant]’s purpose of deterring violations. Clearly, it would have been 
only a minimal interference with their duties to obtain a warrant.”).  
 234. Anthony D. Moulton et al., The Scientific Basis for Law as a Public Health Tool, 99 Am. J. Pub. 
Health 17, 17 (2009) (distinguishing “interventional” public health laws, or those designed to address 
specific health conditions or risk factors, from “infrastructural” public health laws, or those that empower 
public health agencies and jurisdictions); Burris et al., supra note 109, at 175 (further delineating further a 
third category, “incidental public health law,” as comprised of those policies that impact population 
health although they are not on their face oriented toward health). 
 235. Burris et al., supra note 109, at 186. 
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effective policymaking,236 and this framework could be adapted to 
measure the success of those laws as well. 
With respect to interventional laws, the level of certainty required to 
deem a regulation effective can vary. As a general matter, policymakers 
should aim to identify robust evidence, generated using optimal designs 
for establishing causality, to support a particular regulatory approach. In 
other words, does the law itself cause intended changes in targeted health 
outcomes? This question can and should be assessed at different stages.237 
If a policy is being newly considered for implementation, regulators can 
consider evidence generated from comparable contexts to support law 
initiation.238 Alternatively, if the law is already implemented, regulators 
can focus on retrospective evaluations of the specific law as well as 
literature reviewing similar policies to determine whether the law should 
be retained, revised, or abandoned in favor of other policy options 
(Figure 1). Policymakers might also consider a package of laws or a law 
intervention paired with a different type of policy, such as a PDMP 
combined with prescriber education initiatives, in which case they should 
seek evidence to support the interactive effects of these multiple 
interventions.239 
Fortunately, in contemporary times, research on the effectiveness of 
public health law is increasingly available.240 Public health law research 
(“PHLR”) may be generated from within the legal academy, where there 
has been an explosion of empirical work in recent years, or from 
researchers in other social science fields (such as economics, health 
services research, political science, or public policy) that “use systematic 
methods within an explicit theoretical framework to collect and analyze 
data.”241 The translation of available scientific evidence (research) into 
 
 236. Id. at 175, 186; Burris & Anderson, supra note 101, at 109.  
 237. See J. Frank Wharam & Norman Daniels, Toward Evidence-Based Policy Making and Standardized 
Assessment of Health Policy Reform, 298 JAMA 676, 677 (2007) (identifying the need for systematic and 
ongoing evaluations of new health policies, the lack of which has led to the discovery of unintended 
consequences years after policy implementation, and presenting a framework for maximizing the 
effectiveness and ethical characteristics of health policy. The four essential elements identified in the 
framework include: “(1) [r]eview to ensure that the policy’s fundamental precepts are ethical . . . (2) 
[t]argeted pilot projects or timely retrospective assessments to address benefits and harms for 
stakeholders . . . (3) [s]tudies to determine if unintended consequences can be satisfactorily 
minimized . . . [and] (4) [f]eedback systems to maintain acceptable outcomes after policy implementation.”). 
 238. Burris et al., supra note 109, at 187.  
 239. See Nancy E. Kass, An Ethics Framework for Public Health, 91 Am. J. Pub. Health 1776, 1778 
(2001) (observing that if a law is one of multiple and varied interventions that together are designed to 
reduce health risks and poor health, then interventions and studies must be designed with the 
awareness of the relationship between this program of interventions and ultimate reduction in 
morbidity and mortality).  
 240. For example, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation funded a large Public Health Law 
Research initiative starting in 2008, to promote the scientific study of the relationship between laws 
and legal practices, and population health. Burris et al., supra note 109, at 171. 
 241. Id. at 172. In other words, they engage in “research.” Id.  
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public health policy and law, though a critical step, has historically been 
under-emphasized and constitutes a key criterion in the framework for 
evaluating the success of public health law (Figure 1).242 Moreover, 
evidence included for this translation should be selected with care, based 
on some hierarchy of rigor and robustness, to avoid regrettable health 
policy decisions based on inadequate or misleading research.243 
1. Outcome Variables of Interest 
Intended outcomes that signify improved public health should be 
pre-defined by policymakers based on policy needs and targeted health 
risks. Public health targets of interventional laws can be categorized as 
primary and secondary outcomes, as described below. Other non-health-
related or process-oriented benefits of legal interventions may accrue 
and are important, such as increased employment or community building 
in the process of carrying out the law, but these benefits are ancillary to 
the main goals of public health regulation.244 At the forefront of 
policymakers’ minds when considering public health regulation should be 
stated goals of improving population health.245 
 
 242. See Jonathan E. Fielding et al., How Do We Translate Science into Public Health Policy and 
Law?, 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 22 (2002); see also Kass, supra note 239, at 1780 (noting that due to the 
all-too-common situation in which PHLR findings are not translated into policy, benefits can fail to 
accrue from the research. Institutional review boards allow research to proceed with the expectation 
that a benefit to research subjects or communities will emerge. Without translation into policy, the 
risk-to-benefit ratio of the research will rarely weigh in favor of research proceeding). But see Burris & 
Anderson, supra note 101, at 107–08 (discussing the influential nature of PHLR on policymaking, in 
both a top-down and bottom-up fashion. Research funding so crucial to creating a robust PHLR base, 
however, has been disproportionately light in comparison to its wide use and impact). Some of this 
policy translation has failed to occur for reasons outside of the effectiveness evidence, such as budget 
constraints and public support. See infra Part II.C.; see also Stephanie Zaza et al., Using Science-Based 
Guidelines to Shape Public Health Law, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics (Special Supp.) 65, 66 (2003) (observing 
that legislators often shy away from evidence-based decisionmaking simply because they lack the 
knowledge to understand the science or because they lack confidence in the actual health benefits and 
effectiveness of a proposed intervention); Beverly Gard et al., Connecting Public Health Law with 
Science, 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics (Special Supp.) 100, 100 (2004).  
 243. See Sumit R. Majumdar & Stephen B. Soumerai, “The Unhealthy State of Health Policy 
Research,” 28 Health Aff. w900 (2002) (discussing examples where researchers failed to adopt core 
principles of study design prerequisite to producing valid evidence, such as in the field of health 
information technology, which arguably led to the adoption of ineffective interventions. Worse, such 
an evidence-base could lead to the unintended consequence of population harm); see also Stephen B. 
Soumerai et al., How Do You Know Which Health Care Effectiveness Research You Can Trust? A 
Guide to Study Design for the Perplexed, 12 Preventing Chronic Disease: Pub. Health Research, 
Practice & Pol’y 1 (2015).  
 244. Kass, supra note 239, at 1778. These incidental benefits may play a role in balancing of 
benefits and harms when considering whether regulation should be undertaken.  
 245. Id. (“[A] reduction in morbidity and mortality need not and could not be the goal of every 
individual public health intervention or program; however, individual public health programs should 
not be undertaken that are not part of a larger package of programs whose combined goal is the 
reduction of morbidity and mortality.”). 
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Population health improvements can be measured in terms of 
primary outcomes or secondary outcomes. Primary outcomes are ideal 
measures of public health law effectiveness, as these directly reflect 
population health sought to be addressed by the law. Those considered of 
value to state policymakers include population-level morbidity and mortality 
measures.246 Pre-defined and “clinically significant” improvements in 
primary outcomes typically include reductions in diagnosed illnesses or 
deaths. In the PDMP context, primary targeted outcomes that signify 
improved health include reduced opioid-related overdoses, substance 
abuse treatment admissions, emergency department visits, and rates of 
addiction. 
Secondary outcomes considered in public health law evaluations 
include proximal or intermediate outcomes that lie along the pathways of 
effect. Such proxy outcome variables include changes to environments and 
behaviors that expose individuals to health risks.247 PDMP proximal 
outcomes include changed prescriber and patient behavior, reduced 
controlled substance supply, and enhanced law enforcement or other 
surveillance activity. Changes in prescribing behavior indicative of reduced 
opioid misuse and overdose risk include, for example, lower rates of 
prescribing of high-morphine-equivalent dosages248 or less co-prescribing 
of opioids and benzodiazepines.249 Reduced rates of doctor shopping250 
and drug diversion reflect changes in patient behaviors and/or law 
enforcement activity, from which lowered opioid adverse health effects 
theoretically follow. 
While primary outcome measures are the ultimate measure of 
public health law effectiveness, a focus on intermediate (or secondary) 
outcomes is often necessary or reasonable for several reasons.251 First, the 
time horizon required to detect changes in population health often can 
be lengthy,252 because reduced morbidity and mortality attributable to a 
policy take time to manifest and measure. Take opioid misuse, for 
instance: Even if a PDMP reduces incident opioid addiction by erecting 
appropriate barriers to individuals obtaining prescriptions, reductions in 
population-level overdoses and mortality will take some time to manifest 
 
 246. Burris et al., supra note 109, at 177–78; Kass, supra note 239, at 1777.  
 247. Id.  
 248. Jane A. Baumblatt et al., High-Risk Use by Patients Prescribed Opioids for Pain and Its Role 
in Overdose Deaths, 174 JAMA 796 (2014); Nathaniel Katz et al., Usefulness of Prescription 
Monitoring Programs for SurveillanceAnalysis of Schedule II Opioid Prescription Data in 
Massachusetts, 1996–2006, 19 Pharmacoepidemiology & Drug Safety 115 (2010); Logan et al., supra 
note 52; Wilsey et al., supra note 53.  
 249. Logan et al., supra note 52; Wilsey et al., supra note 53; Dunn et al., supra note 53. 
 250. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 67, for a definition of “doctor 
shopping.”  
 251. Burris et al., supra note 109, at 177–79.  
 252. Id.  
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because an already-addicted population will continue to experience these 
adverse health outcomes in the short-term. Also, ultimate health 
outcomes like opioid-related overdoses and hospitalizations are so rare 
that they must be observed over some time to detect policy-attributable 
changes, if there are any. It is thus more practicable and still telling to 
measure changes in prescribing patterns as a proxy for changes in the 
environment that ultimately would contribute to reduced opioid-related 
adverse health outcomes. Second, because ultimate health outcomes are 
often attenuated from laws or policies, understanding mechanisms that 
may lead to changes in these outcomes increases confidence that any 
effects observed are indeed attributable to a particular intervention. 
Access to and measurement of intermediary variables along the causal 
pathway avoids exclusive use of sometimes unpersuasive ecological 
studies, not uncommon to the PHLR literature.253 
2. Assessing the Evidence 
Policymakers and researchers should explicitly identify the intended 
and/or anticipated pathways of effect from law to health outcomes. 
Research supporting or refuting aspects of this pathway can be located 
within a causal model,254 while gaps in the research base may also become 
apparent. But how can regulators identify empirical research worth 
including in the evidence base to either support or call into question 
public health laws? PHLR can be good science, but this is not true across 
the field. Furthermore, some laws lend themselves to evaluation better 
than others.255 Principles of research design can be used to guide 
policymakerseven those with limited empirical trainingin identifying 
scientific evidence worth incorporating into policy.256 
A wide array of research methods are available for studying the 
effects of public health laws,257 ranging from qualitative research,258 to 
observational studies,259 to quasi-experiments,260 to randomized controlled 
 
 253. Burris & Anderson, supra note 101, at 108. 
 254. See Jeffrey Swanson & Jennifer Ibrahim, Picturing Public Health Law Research: Using Causal 
Diagrams to Model and Test Theory, in Public Health Law Research: Theory and Methods 217–36 
(eds. Alexander C. Wagenaar & Scott Burris, 1st ed. 2013).  
 255. Burris & Anderson, supra note 101, at 107–08.  
 256. Soumerai et al., supra note 243, at 14–15. 
 257. See generally Swanson & Ibrahim, supra note 254 (discussing the mechanisms, theories, and 
models central to public health law research). 
 258. Robert Drislane & Gary Parkinson, Qualitative Research, Online Dictionary of the Soc. Sci. 
(2011), http://bitbucket.icaap.org/dict.pl (defining “qualitative research” as “[r]esearch using methods 
such as participant observation or case studies which result in a narrative, descriptive account of a 
setting or practice”). 
 259. William R. Shadish et al., Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized 
Causal Inference 12 (2002) (providing that, synonymous with a correlational study, an observational study 
is one “that simply observes the size and direction of a relationship among variables”). 
 260. Id. (“An experiment in which units are not assigned to conditions randomly.”). 
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experiments.261 Study design types within these broad categories of 
research can be characterized by the inter-related concepts of rigor, 
suitability for causal inference, and capacity to control for common 
biases.262 
A simplified hierarchy of designs can assist policymakers (ideally in 
coordination with researchers) in organizing PHLR to assess whether 
sufficient evidence exists to support law adoption or continued existence. 
The quantity of evidence is important here,263 although less so than the 
quality of evidence used to determine policy effectiveness and the 
generalizability of the evidence to the context in question. Table 2 
suggests a way to organize studies, generally arranged from the strongest 
to weakest designs for causal inference (that is, to demonstrate that 
effects were caused by the policy studied). Randomized controlled 
experiments, the “gold-standard” for inferring a causal relationship 
between the law and an outcome,264 are quite rare in PHLR.265 Thus, 
natural experiments, or those where the intervention is not randomly 
assigned, are important to consider.266 The hierarchy presented is by no 
means exhaustive of the different types of studies that policymakers may 
encounter. Rather, it is intended as a starting point to assist in assessing 
the value of PHLR for policy incorporation. 
 
 261. Id. (“An experiment in which units are assigned to receive the treatment or an alternative 
condition by a random process such as the toss of a coin or a table of random numbers.”).  
 262. See, e.g., Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 657–62 (providing a helpful catalogue of 
methodological approaches to the empirical study of health laws, from strongest to weakest designs, 
and also displaying the rating system used by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force in considering 
whether sufficient evidence exists to support a preventive health measure); Soumerai et al., supra note 
243, at 15.  
 263. Kass, supra note 239, at 1778–79 (suggesting that the greater the burdens posed by a program, 
the stronger the evidence base must be to support that a program will achieve its stated goals). 
 264. Because the law is “randomly assigned” to an intervention group and not the comparison 
group, the two groups theoretically are comparable on every other dimension. Therefore, the effects 
found can be attributed to the intervention rather than confounding variables. Confounding variables 
are those that could be related to both the intervention and the outcome variable, and could thus 
explain any changes in outcomes observed.  
 265. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 660. But see Alan S. Gerber et al., Evaluating Public Health 
Law Using Randomized Experiments, in Public Health Law Research: Theory and Methods, supra 
note 254, at 283–306. 
 265. Shadish et al., supra note 259, at 171–206. 
 266. See Alexander C. Wagenaar & Kelli A. Komro, Natural Experiments: Research Design 
Elements for Optimal Causal Inference Without Randomization, in Public Health Law Research: 
Theory and Methods, supra note 254, at 307–24. 
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Table 2. Hierarchy of Public Health Law Research Designs 
 





which units are 
assigned to receive 
a legal intervention 
or no intervention 
by a random 
process (e.g., toss of 
a coin or lottery).268  
 
 
 “Gold standard” 
of evidence for 
identifying causal 
relationships.  
 If randomization 






 External validity 
(i.e. 
generalizability 
to other contexts, 
populations) is 
limited.  






Study that specifies 
a time at which an 
intervention 
occurred to 
“interrupt” the prior 
situation (e.g., time 
at which a law is 
effective) and 
observes outcomes 
over multiple time 
points pre- and 
post-interruption.269 
Stronger design if it 
includes a 
comparison group 






and any changes 
in level or trend 
of the outcome 


















secular trends.  
 
 267. Study validity can be characterized in a number of ways. This table and accompanying discussion 
focus on internal validity and external validity. “Internal validity” refers to the validity of inferences about 
whether observed covariance between treatment (intervention) and outcome variables reflects a causal 
relationship. “External validity” refers to the validity of inferences about whether the cause-effect 
relationship holds over variation in persons, settings, treatment variables, and measurement variables. 
Shadish et al., supra note 259. 
 268. Id. at 12–13.  
 269. Id. at 171–206. 
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are assigned to a 
condition (e.g., 
health insurance 
coverage) on the 
basis of a cutoff 
score (e.g., income). 













the cutoff criteria 












Study that compares 
outcomes before 
and after the 
intervention in a 
group exposed to an 
intervention 
compared to a 







 Not accounting 
for differing 











adjusts for potential 
confounding 




 Can rule out that 




than the law of 
interest by 
including these 




 Cannot rule out 
that secular 








 270. Id. at 207–43. 
 271. Soumerai et al., supra note 243, at 15.  
 272. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 659–60; Soumerai et al., supra note 243, at 15.  
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Study is descriptive 
only, measuring 
outcome variable at 
one point in time 
after the 





variables (i.e., use 
multivariate, instead 








Precision in the 
measure of this 
relationship is 
enhanced if other 
variables that 
relate to both 
(i.e., 
confounders) are 
included in the 
model.  
 No baseline 
measure(s) to 
provide a basis 



















by multiple study 
participants. 
 
 Can provide rich 




 Subjective and 
susceptible to 
response bias.274 




Case studies Description of 
policy intervention 
experience using a 
particular example 
or set of examples.  
 







selected may be 
unique and not 
generalizable to 
other contexts.276  
 
In addition to the above categories of designs for individual studies, 
other types of research aim to aggregate the findings of multiple primary 
studies and may be very valuable to policymakers. Systematic reviews 
use explicit methods to identify and critically review research relating to 
a particular outcome or set of outcomes and evaluate the strength of 
their findings to arrive at a general conclusion about the literature.277 
Meta-analyses apply quantitative statistical analyses to pool and analyze 
findings from different studies to arrive at effect estimates of similar 
interventions across the literature.278 There are certain collaborative 
entities, such as the Cochrane Collaboration, Campbell Collaboration, and 
The Community Guide (of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) 
pioneering the work in these areas, although relatively few systematic-type 
 
 273. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 658–60.  
 274. Id. at 658.  
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 661; Moulton et al., supra note 234, at 17. 
 278. Id. 
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reviews are available relative to the numerous and varied types of public 
health laws in existence.279 Finally, “comparative effectiveness” studies do 
not necessarily encompass a specific study design type, but are defined as 
those that compare methods to “prevent, treat, and monitor a clinical 
condition or to improve the delivery of care,” and to inform 
decisionmaking by policymakers, among others.280 This definition can 
potentially include head-to-head comparisons of community- and 
population-level interventions to improve health conditions, such public 
health law approaches to treating prescription opioid misuse.281 
Comparative effectiveness research, although in its infancy in the United 
States, is enjoying substantial federal funding282 and may be increasingly 
available and relevant to public health policymaking in the future. 
3. PDMP Effectiveness 
The body of research investigating PDMP effectiveness is beginning 
to generate information about whether these policies impact opioid-
related primary health outcomes or proximal outcomes. Although the 
literature is growing and of a respectable size, many studies are not 
rigorous enough to warrant policy incorporation or replication, when 
compared against the hierarchy of research designs presented in Table 2. 
Several more recent studies, though, use long-term data from multiple 
states and assess specific PDMP features to draw conclusions about 
PDMP impacts. As these kinds of stronger studies proliferate, a clearer 
sense of PDMP effectiveness will emerge. 
The Appendix Table catalogs key studies of PDMPs that shed light 
on identified primary and secondary outcomes.283 The Table summarizes 
the results of a search of social science and medical peer-reviewed 
literature284 for studies that measure the effects of state-based, electronic 
 
 279. See Moulton et al., supra note 234, at 17, for a detailed discussion and catalogue of systematic 
reviews available for interventional public health laws, as well as identification of notable gaps in the 
field; see also Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 661. 
 280. Jane Hyatt Thorpe, Comparative Effectiveness Research and Health Reform: Implications for 
Public Health Policy and Practice, 125 Pub. Health Rep. 909, 909 (2010) (quoting the Institute of 
Medicine’s definition of comparative effectiveness research). 
 281. Id.  
 282. Id. at 909–10. 
 283. See supra Part II.B.1 for identification of these outcomes. 
 284. The helpfulness of unpublished PDMP evaluations, such as those conducted internally by 
states, for informing policy is limited by the widespread use of uncontrolled designs (that is, the studies 
fail to include a comparison group for reference when evaluating a particular PDMP) and contexts 
which are difficult to generalize across states. Further, these evaluations are not subject to the peer-
review process. Also, evaluations of PDMPs in other countries, most notably Canada, are not included 
in the literature presented. Extrapolating results from these studies presents numerous challenges 
given differing health care systems, prescribing norms, patient behaviors, and PDMP features. See 
Yoko Murphy et al., Prescription Opioid Use, Harms and Interventions in Canada: A Review Update of 
New Developments and Findings Since 2010, 18 Pain Physician E605, E610–E611 (2015). 
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PDMPs.285 Included in the Table are the published analyses that employ 
quasi-experimental and observational designs (see Table 2). Although 
this review does not focus on them, qualitative studies can offer further 
insights into the relationship between PDMPs and health outcomes, and 
should supplement policymaker considerations. The Appendix Table 
should not be considered exhaustive of research bearing on PDMPs, but 
it includes the best candidate studies currently available for drawing 
causal inferences about the public health effects of PDMPs. 
Although some have interpreted the PDMP literature as providing 
strong evidence of program effectiveness,286 the story is far from clear.287 
We still lack a robust understanding of whether PDMPs reduce opioid-
related overdose deaths, the ultimate health outcome of interest. The 
best available study uses national mortality data from the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention to find no association between PDMPs 
and overdose mortality.288 However, the data used is somewhat outdated 
(1999–2005) and spans over a period when PDMPs were not very 
robust.289 On the other hand, states with PDMPs do seem to experience 
fewer opioid-related treatment admissions and poisonings, based on two 
strong quasi-experimental studies.290 These analyses used national 
poisoning and treatment admission data cumulatively spanning from 
1997 through 2009 and characterized states of study based on the 
 
 285. There is a decent-sized body of literature on paper PDMPs, particularly focusing on their 
impact on benzodiazepine prescribing. However, this literature is not included in Appendix Table 
because paper PDMPs were a substantially different intervention from electronic PDMPs and were 
implemented during a different prescribing era. This literature thus may have limited generalizability 
to electronic PDMPs. See Tamara M. Haegerich et al., What We Know, and Don’t Know, About the 
Impact of State Policy and Systems-Level Interventions on Prescription Drug Overdose, 145 Drug & 
Alcohol Dependence 34, 37–38 (2014), for a summary of these paper PDMP studies.  
 286. See, e.g. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Ctr. of Excellence at Brandeis, supra 
note 69, at 3; Julie Worley, Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, a Response to Doctor Shopping: 
Purpose, Effectiveness, and Directions for Future Research, 33 Issues in Mental Health Nursing 319, 
326 (2012).  
 287. See Haegerich et al., supra note 285, at 37–38 (presenting an astute but limited review of the 
PDMP evaluation literature from 1946–2014. The authors conclude that “later studies . . . have not 
clearly established significant effects on total opioid prescribing or health outcomes with PDMPs. The 
largest limitation is the lack of detailed data on prescribing volume and patterns prior to PDMP 
implementation, which forced the use of cross-section, observational study designs. The effect sizes in 
the most recent studies have been small, making it conceivable that the differences are due to 
unaddressed confounding variables. There is yet little data to settle the question of whether specific 
actions of PDMPs (e.g., proactive reporting) add to their effectiveness.”). No rigorous systematic 
reviews study PDMP effects.  
 288. See Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and Death Rates from 
Drug Overdose, 12 Pain Med. 747 (2011). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Liza M. Reifler et al., Do Prescription Monitoring Programs Impact State Trends in Opioid 
Abuse/Misuse?, 13 Pain Med. 434 (2012); Richard M. Reisman et al., Prescription Opioid Usage and Abuse 
Relationships: An Evaluation of State Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Efficacy, 3 Substance Abuse: 
Res. & Treatment 41 (2009). 
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presence or absence of a PDMP.291 Reifler et al. went a step further and 
conducted sub-analyses of “superior” PDMP featuresfor example, 
program was in effect for a long time, sent unsolicited reports, and 
monitored comprehensive drug schedulesto find consistent results.292 
Although further study of all primary health outcomes is warranted, 
these studies suggest that PDMPs are at least associated with decreased 
poisonings and admissions. 
However, the mechanism of effect (or secondary outcomes) to 
explain reduced treatment admissions and poisonings is uncertain. The 
literature findings are mixed as to whether state PDMPs reduce opioid 
supply or prescribing. Several quasi-experimental studies use national 
opioid supply data spanning 1997 through 2008 to draw different 
conclusions regarding whether PDMPs are associated with reduced 
supply. Another quasi-experimental study conducted by Rutkow et al. 
found that Florida’s (voluntary) PDMP and pill mill law combined to 
drive modest decreases in total opioid fills and morphine concentration 
per dose (but not days’ supply of drugs) among the highest baseline users 
and prescribers, respectively.293 This strong analysis nevertheless suffers 
from an imperfect comparison stateGeorgia, which had much lower 
prescribing at baselineand an inability to isolate PDMP effects from 
those of another intervention.294 Weaker observational studies have 
drawn mixed conclusions about the effect of PDMPs on prescribing 
behavior and typically include small sample sizes, which limit their 
generalizability.295 Finally, there is very little evidence to suggest that 
PDMPs reduce doctor shopping or diversion, given that the few studies 
available on these outcomes do not lend themselves to causal 
inference.296 
Although the evidence base in support of PDMPs is growing, it 
requires significant further exploration and rigor. Weaknesses in the 
 
 291. Id. 
 292. Reifler et al., supra note 290.  
 293. See Rutkow et al., supra note 167. 
 294. Id. 
 295. See David F. Baehren et al., A Statewide Prescription Monitoring Program Affects Emergency 
Department Prescribing Behaviors, 56 Annals Emergency Med. 19 (2010); Chris Ringwalt et al., The 
Effects of North Carolina’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program on the Prescribing Behaviors of the 
State’s Providers, 36 J. Primary Prevention 131 (2015); Matthew W. McAllister et al., Impact of 
Prescription Drug-Monitoring Program on Controlled Substance Prescribing in the ED, 33 Am. J. 
Emergency Med. 781 (2015); Scott G. Weiner et al., Clinician Impression Versus Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Program Criteria in the Assessment of Drug-Seeking Behavior in the Emergency Department, 
62 Annals Emergency Med. 281 (2013). 
 296. See, e.g., Linda Simoni-Wastila & Jingjing Qian, Influence of Prescription Monitoring 
Programs on Analgesic Utilization by an Insured Retiree Population, 21 Pharmacoepidemiology & 
Drug Safety 1261 (2012); Hilary L. Surratt et al., Reductions in Prescription Opioid Diversion 
Following Recent Legislative Interventions in Florida, 23 Pharmacoepidemiology & Drug Safety 314 
(2014). 
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literature are numerous. First, many of the more rigorous studies were 
conducted during a period when PDMPs were much weaker 
policiesfor instance, through the early 2000s, programs typically 
monitored only Schedule II substances and were seldom queriedand 
thus need updating. Second, most studies are not rigorous, with no 
randomized controlled trials and few quasi-experimental studies 
available. Many studies also lack a comparison group, fail to measure 
outcomes before a policy went into effect, or include small sample sizes. 
Third, studies typically do not adequately account for many other, co-
occurring prescription drug misuse policy interventions (such as pill mill 
laws, or opioid drug reformulations), and thus could falsely attribute 
effects to PDMPs instead of to these policies. Finally, mixed results could 
be attributable to divergent PDMP policies, which are typically not 
carefully characterized in studies. Studies could do a much better job of 
differentiating the PDMP interventions based on policy strength. 
A major drawback in PDMP studies, moreover, is the typical failure 
to account for actual levels of PDMP use by prescribers, which is still 
thought to be quite low.297 The median PDMP registration rate among 
providers who issued at least one controlled substance prescription was 
thirty-five percent from 2009–2012,298 and not all enrolled prescribers 
regularly query PDMPs. A recent national study found that only fifty-
three percent of primary care physicians reportedly use their state’s 
PDMP.299 Although studies do suggest that PDMP awareness is high and 
that use is increasing over time,300 database queries are still sufficiently 
low that not incorporating this measure into studies may dilute any 
potential findings of effect. Also, further investigation is required into 
whether targeting increased use among a subset of high-volume 
 
 297. But see Ringwalt et al., supra note 295; Chris Delcher et al., Abrupt Decline in Oxycodone-
Caused Mortality After Implementation of Florida’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 150 Drug 
& Alcohol Dependence 63 (2015) (incorporating a measure of PDMP queries into the intervention 
variable).  
 298. Peter Kreiner et al., Bureau of Justice Assistance Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Program Performance Measures Report: January 2009 through June 2012 (2013). The percentage 
of prescribers who registered with the program (among prescribers who issued at least one controlled 
substance prescription in the prior three months) from 2009–2012 ranged from one to eighty-two 
percent based on the state. Id. at 15–16. 
 299. Lainie Rutkow et al., Most Primary Care Physicians Are Aware of Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs, But Many Find the Data Difficult to Access, 34 Health Aff. 484, 487 (2015).  
 300. See, e.g., Jeanmarie Perrone et al., Prescribing Practices, Knowledge, and Use of Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP) by a National Sample of Medical Toxicologists, 8 J. Med. 
Toxicology 341 (2012); Lance Feldman et al., Awareness and Utilization of a Prescription Monitoring 
Program Among Physicians, 13 J. Pain & Palliative Care Pharmacotherapy 908 (2011); Lance 
Feldman et al., Influencing Controlled Substance Prescribing: Attending and Resident Physician Use of 
a State Prescription Monitoring Program, 13 J. Pain Med. 908 (2012); Kirstin Barrett & Ashby Watson, 
Physician Perspectives on a Pilot Prescription Monitoring Program, 19 J. Pain & Palliative Care 
Pharmacotherapy 5 (2005). 
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prescribers, rather than all physicians or controlled substance prescribers, 
is warranted. 
Because so many varied PDMPs have been implemented, 
policymakers and researchers should now look to evidence from multi-
state, retrospective, comparative evaluations of their effectiveness.301 This 
evidence base needs to be updated, using longer-term data from before and 
after program implementation, now that sufficient time has passed since 
electronic PDMPs were implemented in many jurisdictions. Identifying 
appropriate comparison jurisdictions to enable quasi-experimental designs is 
somewhat of a challenge, given that forty-nine states have adopted their own 
PDMPs. Thus, time variation in PDMP adoption or implementation of 
certain features offers opportunities for comparative studies. For instance, 
the impact of relatively recent “strong” PDMP mandates on reduced opioid 
prescribing (requiring that prescribers check the systems regularly) shows 
promise in the handful of states that have adopted this policy lever,302 but 
requires additional empirical support. Also, comparison outcomes offer 
new avenues. For example, researchers can compare opioid prescribing 
for acute pain or headaches (indications where opioids have been shown 
to have limited utility) versus that for cancer (where opioid prescribing 
receives little scrutiny). One would hypothesize that PDMPs would 
reduce opioid prescribing in the former case, but not the latter. 
The literature would benefit from a greater interdisciplinary focus 
by incorporating prescribers, pharmacists, program administrators, law 
experts, and health services researchers into informing and designing 
studies. Prescribers and pharmacists can provide clinical expertise 
germane to generating hypotheses about which PDMP features are likely 
to impact prescribing behavior, and to identifying appropriate comparison 
outcomes (see above example). Law experts can assist in categorizing 
PDMPs as robust or weak for comparison purposes, based on assessment 
of their policy features or enforcement. Policymakers can identify key 
outcomes of interest with regard to PDMP effectiveness. Program 
administrators can provide PDMP data for study and an understanding 
of the operational particulars of the programs, such as user-ship. And 
health services researchers can help to design the best studies feasible 
using available data. 
 
 301. Twenty PDMPs currently require that evaluations be reported to the legislature at least 
annually regarding the effectiveness of the programs and how they are impacting prescribing. Nat’l 
All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 11. These types of reporting requirements would 
offer a prime opportunity for policymakers to work with researchers and program administrators to 
enhance the evidence base, particularly by conducting studies using comparison states or comparison 
outcomes.  
 302. Linda Rasubala et al., Impact of Mandatory Prescription Drug Monitoring Program on 
Prescription of Opioid Analgesics by Dentists, 10 PLOS ONE 1 (2015) (discussing a strong assessment 
of the New York i-STOP mandate’s impact on opioid prescribing among dentists). See Haffajee et al., 
supra note 70. 
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Finally, comparative effectiveness studies that compare PDMPs to 
other state interventions targeting opioid misuse, such as pill mill laws or 
access to opioid antagonists, would provide timely information to 
regulators regarding how to best invest their limited resources to tackle 
prescription opioid misuse. If PDMPs are implemented concurrently with 
other interventions, as was the case in Florida where PDMPs and other 
policies were pursued in quick succession, it may be practically difficult to 
separate out PDMP independent effects, and thus co-effects that are less 
generalizable to other jurisdictions must be considered.303 Exploration into 
all these areas would assist policymakers to most effectively address 
prescription drug misuse and would serve to facilitate decisions regarding 
whether to retain, amend, or abandon PDMPs. 
C. Ethical Considerations 
A third broad inquiry for state policymakers asks whether ethical 
objections advise against public health law implementation or perpetuation. 
Even if a policy falls within the appropriate legal parameters for state 
action and seems likely, or is proven, to be effective in addressing the 
public health problem, there may be ethical objections that, if substantial, 
should bar its implementation or continued existence. 
The community-level focus of public health calls for a set of 
justificatory considerations distinct from those used in clinical medical 
settings where the treatment and cure of individual patients are 
paramount.304 Instead, public health is primarily concerned with the well-
being of populations, the broader social and environmental determinants 
of health, and prevention of ill societal health.305 Public health ethics 
frameworks that are practice-based emerged from an explicit recognition 
of these distinguishing features and unique moral considerations in public 
 
 303. See Rutkow et al., supra note 299 (studying the interactive effects of the Florida PDMP law 
and pill mill laws on opioid prescribing and total opioid volume). But see Delcher et al., supra note 297 
(attempting to “control” for three co-interventions that impacted Floridaincluding the Florida pill 
mill law, DEA pill mill crackdown, and OxyContin reformulationin the multivariate regression 
model).  
 304. Kass, supra note 239, at 1776 (“[C]odes of medical and research ethics generally give high 
priority to individual autonomy, a priority that cannot be assumed to be appropriate for public health 
practice. . . . A framework of ethics is needed, both to provide practical guidance for public health 
professionals and to highlight the defining values of public health, values that differ in morally relevant 
ways from values that define clinical practice and research.”). See Lisa M. Lee, Public Health Ethics 
Theory: Review and Paths to Convergence, 34 J. L. Med. & Ethics 85, 87 (2012); James F. Childress et 
al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 170, 170 (2002); Ross E.G. 
Upshur, Principles for the Justification of Public Health Intervention, 93 Canadian J. Pub. Health 101, 
101 (2002). 
 305. Upshur, supra note 304, at 101. The Institute of Medicine has defined public health as “what 
we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions in which people can be healthy.” Inst. of 
Med., The Future of Public Health 19 (1988). 
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health.306 Rather than try to provide a comprehensive philosophical 
approach to public health in practice, they rely upon the foundational 
values of rights (positive and negative) and social justice.307 Specifically, a 
code of public health ethics should emphasize the negative rights of 
citizens to noninterference, affirmative societal obligations to improve 
the health of the overall population, and the need to fulfill these 
obligations with special focus on the needs of the most disadvantaged.308 
The principles proposed provide practical guidance for practitioners faced 
with public health-related ethical quandaries,309 including policymakers 
implementing public health laws.310 
Public health ethics principles set forth by Kass311 and Childress312 
provide useful guideposts for the ethical implementation of public health 
laws. These conditions do not explicitly include, but instead complement 
and assume, favorable performance under those criteria already set forth 
herein (that is, the legal permissibility and effectiveness of a law designed 
to address a significant public health threat).313 Although not an exact 
algorithm to resolve conflicts between the goal of public health and other 
moral considerations, the following ethical conditions can help guide 
determinations about the appropriateness of public health interventions, 
and include: (1) proportionality; (2) minimal infringement; (3) fairness; 
and (4) public accountability.314 A brief discussion of the principles follows, 
and each is applied to the PDMP contextalthough it is important to bear 
 
 306. Id. 
 307. Lee, supra note 304, at 87–90; Kass, supra note 239, at 1777.  
 308. Kass, supra note 239, at 1777; Gostin, supra note 101, at 10–11 (discussing the social justice 
moral impulses that animate public health: (1) to advance human well-being by improving health; and 
(2) to do so by particularly focusing on the needs of the most disadvantaged. To satisfy these aims 
succeeds in bringing the good of health to all members of the population).  
 309. Lee, supra note 304, at 87–88. 
 310. Kass, supra note 239, at 1777 (“Indeed, it is in great part because such power is vested in 
public health by law that a code or framework of ethics designed specifically for public health is so 
very important.”). 
 311. See id. 
 312. Childress et al., supra note 304.  
 313. Several of the justificatory conditions included in public health ethics frameworks proposed 
by other scholars actually overlap with legal requirements set forth in Part II.A supra, and the general 
requirement of effectiveness set forth in Part II.B supra. For example, James Childress et al. require 
that a public health policy be necessary, effective, and minimally infringing. Childress et al., supra note 
304, at 173. Nancy Kass requires that a public health policy be effective at reducing mortality and 
morbidity and minimally infringing. Kass, supra note 239, at 1778–80. Richard Upshur requires that 
the program be minimally restrictive. Upshur, supra note 304, at 102. Minimal infringement is included 
in the present framework as an ethical principle because, depending on the type of policy, the law 
requires varying degrees of inquiry into the level of infringement and whether less restrictive 
alternatives are available. By including minimal infringement as an ethical principle, an inquiry must 
be made into the reasonableness of the intrusiveness of the law, not merely whether an obviously less 
restrictive means is available. See infra Part II.A.1.  
 314. Childress et al., supra note 304, at 173.  
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in mind that every state PDMP is unique and must be assessed on a case-
by-case basis. 
1. Proportionality 
First, it is critical to demonstrate that the benefits of a public health law 
outweigh the costs or infringements associated with its implementation.315 
Proportionality requires the weighing of societal benefits against burdens, in 
order to help assess whether a particular law is the best use of available 
resources.316 There are two dimensions of proportionality: one that considers 
societal benefits against individual burdens and another that considers 
societal benefits against societal burdens. Individual burdens, such as liberty 
and privacy, will be further addressed below in the discussion of “minimal 
infringement.”317 The societal benefits of PDMPs include changes in the 
primary and secondary outcomes outlined above: Reducing opioid-related 
adverse health outcomes, improving prescribing, and reducing diversion or 
doctor shopping. Societal benefits also include reduced expenditures 
associated with prescription drug misuse, as well as more intangible but 
potentially substantial benefits associated with reduced unemployment, 
absenteeism, and family disruption. Illicit drug use (a large percentage of 
which involves opioids) costs our nation $11 billion in health care costs and 
$193 billion annually overall318some of which expenditure could be saved 
if PDMPs work to curb this practice. 
Societal burdens considered should include government costs of 
implementation and enforcement, as well as the opportunity costs of 
expending government and private resources, including political capital, 
instead of pursuing other policies to achieve the same ends. PDMPs are 
expensive to implement and finding the money to implement them has 
proven a challenge. Programs are funded by a combination of federal 
funds, private funds, and state-raised revenues, but often operate at 
 
 315. Id.  
 316. Two tools may be useful to policymakers for comparing costs to benefits. Cost-benefit analysis 
quantifies the costs and benefits of a course of action, comparing them using the same metric (often monetary 
value). Trying to quantify the benefits of a course of action can be challenging and controversial. Thus, in 
health interventions, cost-effectiveness analysis is often favored. Cost-effectiveness analysis divides the 
impact of a program (such as the percentage reduction in new cases of opioid addiction) by the cost of the 
program, generating a statistic termed the “cost-effectiveness ratio” (“CER”). CERs can be compared as 
between different policy interventions or programs. Abdul Latif Jameel, Introduction to Evaluations: Cost-
Benefit/Effectiveness/Comparison Analyses, J-PAL, https://www.povertyactionlab.org/methodology/what-
evaluation/cost-benefiteffectivenesscomparison-analyses (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). For further discussion of 
concepts and benefits of cost-effectiveness analysis for use by policymakers, see World Health Org., 
Making Choices in Health: WHO Guide to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (T. Tan-Torres Edejer et al., 
eds., 2003), http://www.who.int/choice/publications/p_2003_generalised_cea.pdf. 
 317. Individual burdens are the focus of James Childress et al.’s discussion of the proportionality 
principle. See Childress et al., supra note 304, at 173–76.  
 318. The Science of Drug Abuse & Addiction: Trends and Statistics, Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse 
(2015), https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
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impaired capacity when money issues arise.319 The programs are complex 
to operatefrom the technical components (software is usually 
proprietary and owned by contracted software vendors) to ensuring 
confidentiality of information, to checking the accuracy of data inputted by 
dispensers, to promoting or enforcing use by prescribers, to facilitating 
optimal law enforcement use of the data. Substantial resources are 
required to facilitate these tasks. In the current environment, PDMPs 
constitute the dominant state approach to addressing prescription drug 
misuse, perhaps at the opportunity cost of investing money and political 
capital into other opioid misuse prevention efforts. In order to justify 
these societal costs, the health benefits and cost savings will need to be 
explicitly proven. 
Moreover, unintended effectsboth negative and positiveof 
regulation on population health outcomes or on non-health outcomes 
should be included in the calculus. There may be substantial negative 
unintended effects of PDMPs on populations, the extent of which are 
currently unknown. Although a few studies have suggested that electronic 
PDMPs will not have a “chilling” effect on appropriate prescribing,320 
whether PDMPs lead some prescribers to cut back on or discontinue 
appropriate controlled substance prescribing, thereby exacerbating the 
under-treatment of pain epidemic or other maladies, remains to be seen. 
Studies of older paper PDMPs found that prescribers did, indeed, cut 
back on appropriate benzodiazepine prescribing, particularly among 
racial minorities321albeit this was a somewhat different, more forceful 
intervention than most electronic PDMPs. Some studies of early 
electronic PDMPs detected substitution from monitored (Schedule II) to 
non-monitored (Schedule III) opioids,322 which lends support to the 
possibility that PDMPs could change pain management treatment and 
possibly compromise clinical care. Differentiating between appropriate 
and inappropriate opioid prescribing, as well as how to best use PDMPs 
to identify doctor shoppers and diverters, places a substantial onus on 
prescribers (and pharmacists) in an area where clinical disagreements 
abound. Also, if opioid addicts are denied pills because prescribers check 
PDMPs, then they may turn in increasing numbers to heroina 
 
 319. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training & Tech. Assistance Ctr., Brandeis Univ., 
Technical Assistance Guide No. 04-13: Funding Options for Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs, (2013), http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/PDMP_Funding_Options_TAG.pdf. 
 320. See Baehren et al., supra note 295; Ringwalt et al., supra note 295. 
 321. Dennis Ross-Degnan et al., A Controlled Study of the Effects of State Surveillance on 
Indicators of Problematic and Non-problematic Benzodiazepine Use in a Medicaid Population, 34 Int’l 
J. Psychiatry Med. 103 (2004); Sallie-Anne Pearson et al., Racial Disparities in Access After 
Regulatory Surveillance of Benzodiazepines, 166 Archives Internal Med. 572 (2006). 
 322. See Paulozzi et al., supra note 288; Simoni-Wastila & Qian, supra note 296. 
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perverse, negative public health ramification.323 Many of these potential 
unintended consequences of PDMPs are substantial: Research should 
investigate whether they occur, and safety mechanisms should be 
instituted to prevent their matriculation. For instance, if opioid addicts 
are denied prescription drugs, addiction treatment options should be 
recommended and made available so that they are less likely to turn to 
heroin. 
2. Minimal Infringement 
As a corollary to the proportionality requirement, policymakers 
should seek to minimally infringe upon private interests and adopt the 
least restrictive means available. This ethical requirement can be viewed 
as complementary to the legal standards described in Part II.A.1 (and in 
some cases, of a higher threshold). This condition recognizes that there 
may be a number of means to achieving a public health end, and the least 
restrictive one should be favoredparticularly when using powerful police 
powers that are presumptively coercive, the unintended consequences of 
which may be ill understood.324 Individual burdens or harms typically will 
fall into three categories: (1) risks to privacy and confidentiality; (2) risks 
to liberty and self-determination; and (3) risks to justice (which will be 
further addressed as a fairness consideration below).325 Even where a 
public health law may appear to restrict an individual’s liberty, its potential 
to enhance the liberty of other individuals warrants consideration, as 
positive externalities of public health laws abound.326 
PDMPs impose serious individual burdens on prescribers and 
patients. PDMP infringements on prescribers in their clinical practice are 
not insignificant, and prescribers have shown resistance to using PDMPs. 
Commonly cited prescriber objections to use include concerns about 
compromised patient satisfaction ratings (if checking a PDMP results in 
delays or denial of controlled substance prescriptions), unreimbursed 
time associated with using the program, burdensome enrollment 
procedures, cumbersome systems, and the information being viewed as 
unnecessary, incomplete, inaccurate, and/or untimely.327 To minimally 
 
 323. See Leo Beletsky, As Heroin Deaths Skyrocket, Prescription Monitoring Programs May Do More 
Harm, Huffington Post (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leo-beletsky/as-heroin-deaths- 
skyrocket-prescription-monitoring-programs-may-do-more-harm_b_6883944.html. 
 324. Upshur, supra note 304, at 102.  
 325. Kass, supra note 239, at 1779 (discussing the burdens more or less likely to arise from different 
public health activities). Regulations and legislation rank among the most intrusive approaches to public 
healththey are coercive because they typically impose penalties for noncompliance. Id.  
 326. Parmet, supra note 109, at 405.  
 327. Deyo et al., supra note 76. 
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infringe upon prescribers and the physician-patient relationship,328 these 
barriers should be reasonably addressed, for example, by automatically 
enrolling prescribers,329 improving integration into clinical workflow, and 
making data complete through frequent updates and interstate sharing (at 
least among neighboring states). Physicians should not be required to log 
into multiple, cumbersome systems, particularly absent reimbursement for 
their time.330 
Use mandates adopted in twenty-two states raise a particularly 
interesting quandary: They infringe substantially on physicians, but they 
seem to increase use and possibly reduce opioid prescribing volume and 
misuse. Robust evidence, therefore, should be generated from within 
states that have enacted strong mandates (such as New York and 
Tennessee) to justify this policy lever before it is more universally adopted 
given significant prescriber objections.331 At the same time, PDMP features 
that serve to dis-incentivize prescribers from checking the systems, such as 
laws that explicitly provide prescriber immunity from liability for failure to 
check332 or exemption from any obligation to query the systems,333 should 
be abandoned to send the message that PDMPs ought to be checked 
frequently when prescribing monitored substances. 
Infringements on prescribers and patients can also be substantial if 
their private prescription data are disclosed and/or used for law enforcement 
or regulatory purposes. As discussed in Part II.A, allowing law enforcement 
and licensing boards unfettered access to PDMP datanamely, to identify 
high-volume prescribers, doctor shoppers, or diverters absent a court-issued 
warrant or subpoenatoes the line, legally speaking. As an ethical matter, 
even if the law allows wide access in certain jurisdictions, patients and 
prescribers arguably should be afforded heightened privacy protections to 
allow uninhibited doctor-patient decisionmaking to occur. Also, strict data 
security protections, particularly when information flows across states, are 
necessary to minimize confidentiality concerns felt by opioid prescribers and 
patients. These include robust technological protections334 and penalties for 
disclosure by PDMP authorized users. 
Effective PDMPs are likely to benefit third parties, despite other 
liberty infringements. Preventing addiction facilitates the enjoyment of 
 
 328. See Steven E. Weinberger et al., Legislative Interference with the Patient-Physician Relationship, 
367 New Eng. J. Med. 1557 (2012) (citing other examples of doctor-patient interferences, such as 
restrictions on discussions about gun safety imposed in some states).  
 329. Twenty-one states currently require prescribers and dispensers to register with the PDMP. 
Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 39. 
 330. See Haffajee et al., supra note 70.  
 331. Id. 
 332. Twenty-five states provide such immunity. Nat’l. All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra 
note 68, at 38.  
 333. Sixteen states absolve prescribers from any obligation to check PDMPs. Id. at 37.  
 334. See infra Part II.A.4 for PDMP security recommendations.  
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certain liberties by others, such as avoiding the burden of being exposed 
to prescription opioids (which increases the likelihood of using and 
abusing drugs); avoiding caring for, watching suffer, or losing a family 
member or friend; avoiding exposure to HIV or other diseases spread by 
sharing infected needles;335 and avoiding increases in health insurance 
premiums (or taxes for public programs) generated by the costs of 
opioid-related hospitalizations or outpatient visits.336 These benefits 
suggest that a balance must be struck between making PDMPs minimally 
intrusive on individual liberties and making them effectiveas 
mentioned in the mandate discussion above. 
3. Fairness 
A public health law should satisfy a basic requirement of fairness.337 
Although fairness can be articulated using a number of different ethical 
frameworks,338 this discussion centers on the distributive justice theory 
originally conceived by John Rawls,339 which calls for the equitable 
distribution of benefits and costs among populations and communities. 
Kass and Gostin both ground fairness in distributive justice.340 According 
to Kass’s framework, distributive justice in public health obligates the 
government to ensure that interventions address the health of the least 
advantaged; Gostin goes a step further to assert that the negative 
consequences of interventions do not fall disproportionately on the least 
advantaged.341 Because the least advantaged are more vulnerable to 
public health threats as well as least likely to enjoy other social 
determinants of health, they arguably deserve special attention.342 
In the case of prescription opioid misuse, the least advantaged in 
society (as measured by socioeconomic status, for example) are more 
likely to lack robust education about the science and risks of addiction; 
 
 335. See Abby Goodnough, Rural Indiana Struggles to Contend with H.I.V. Outbreak, N.Y Times (May 
5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/us/rural-indiana-struggles-to-contend-with-hiv-outbreak. 
html?_r=0. 
 336. See, e.g., Dr. Holm, Harm from Drug Abuse Extends Beyond the Illicit User, Rapid City J. (Aug. 
3, 2015), http://rapidcityjournal.com/harm-from-drug-abuse-extends-beyond-the-illicit-user/article_95a5e18c- 
fc7c-5386-a946-e74b078b82be.html (suggesting that harms extending beyond the user include “increased 
crime and violence, child and spouse abuse, motor vehicle accidents, sexually spread diseases, fetal 
malformations in children, and deaths due to accidental and intentional overdose”). 
 337. Some of the fairness concepts presented in this Part resemble those of equal protection 
required under the Constitution, briefly discussed supra Part II.A.3, which aims to protect those 
groups subjected to historical discrimination. This ethical inquiry is somewhat broader, however, and 
does not identify specific classes of persons particularly deserving of protection.  
 338. For example, prioritarian or utilitarian frameworks can also be adopted, depending on 
societal conceptions of fairness.  
 339. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).  
 340. Kass, supra note 239, at 1780–81 (noting that this requirement is particularly important if an 
intervention is restrictive).  
 341. Gostin, supra note 101, at 11. 
 342. Id.  
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switch to cheaper and more easily accessed heroin when prescription pills 
are no longer available; have limited treatment options for addiction and 
overdose (such as naloxone access; substance abuse treatment); and lack 
access to social and other support services to address addiction and its 
consequences (such as access to clean needles). These considerations 
mean that PDMPs may be necessary to reduce inequalities, but also that 
any unintended negative consequences should not disproportionately fall 
upon the less advantaged. The paper triplicate form of prescription 
monitoring that preceded electronic PDMPs reduced problematic, as 
well as non-problematic, benzodiazepine use,343 and had disproportionate 
under-prescribing impacts in minority communities.344 The potential for 
these unintended consequences of electronic PDMPs should be closely 
monitored, to see if, for example, certain demographic groups are 
targeted as potential “doctor shoppers” and prescribed to less often as a 
result of these programs. Education and guidelines should accompany 
prescriber use of the systems to promote standardized and conscientious 
use of the data in a way that promotes good health and does not 
exacerbate social inequalities. 
4. Public Accountability 
Finally, the government should strive to be accountable to the 
public when implementing health laws on their behalf. Any public health 
law will infringe on some private interests and impose some social cost, 
and thus should be explained and justified to parties impacted. 
Policymaking transparency respects stakeholders as moral equals who 
deserve to be involved in the decisionmaking process.345 It also is 
essential to creating and maintaining public trust, an element so crucial 
to the acceptability and ultimate effectiveness of public health laws as 
well as the general legitimacy of future policymaking.346 Public health 
policies may be particularly susceptible to backlashin the form of lack 
of public support, legal challenges, noncompliance, or opposition to 
future lawsif they are coercive.347 Policymakers should appreciate that 
different social groups may view public health laws from different 
perspectives and endeavor to gain diverse support.348 In pluralistic 
societies, where there is reasonable disagreement about principles that 
ought to guide priority setting in meeting population health needs given 
limited resources, different viewpoints should be understood and 
 
 343. Ross-Degnan et al., supra note 321.  
 344. Pearson et al., supra note 321.  
 345. Upshur, supra note 304, at 102; Childress et al., supra note 304, at 173. 
 346. Childress et al., supra note 304, at 173; Parmet, supra note 109, at 410.  
 347. Parmet, supra note 109, at 410. 
 348. Parmet et al., supra note 133, at 654. 
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respected, and decisionmaking made as clear and accountable as 
possible.349 
PDMP implementation and policies should thus be transparent to 
the public. Consideration of various features and program amendments 
should be made with the involvement of relevant stakeholders. The 
process of effectuating changes to the Massachusetts PDMP provides an 
example of excellent public accountability in public health lawmaking. In 
August 2012, Massachusetts enacted a law to automatically enroll 
practitioners in its existing PDMP and require that they consult the 
database when prescribing controlled substances to new patients. The 
Commonwealth solicited extensive feedback and held hearings concerning 
these changes. Through this process, prescriber objections to the breadth 
of circumstances for PDMP checks surfaced and were incorporated into 
the final implementation rules in the form of mandate exemptions.350 As a 
result, the cooperation and mutual respect between public health officials 
and Massachusetts providers was likely strengthened, which will facilitate 
future prescription drug misuse prevention endeavors. Prescribers will also 
be more willing to accept and comply with the PDMP mandate now in 
effect. 
Conclusion 
This Article seeks to simplify and systematize the inquiries critical 
for state policymakers when considering public health lawslike 
PDMPsfor implementation. Although various scholars have outlined 
factors that should guide policymaking, for instance in the public health 
ethics and PHLR literature, this Article is the first to synthesize the 
factors under three key criteria relevant to state regulation, suggest the 
policymaking junctures at which they should be applied, and apply them 
to PDMPs. PDMPs constitute the dominant policy adopted by states to 
address prescription opioid misusea profound public health challenge 
that is as complex in etiology as in the policy interventions available to 
combat it. PDMPs exemplify unstructured policymaking uninformed by 
 
 349. Id.; Upshur, supra note 304, at 102; Norman Daniels, Accountability for Reasonableness: 
Establishing a Fair Process for Priority Setting Is Easier than Agreeing on Principles, 321 British Med. 
J. 1300, 1300 (2000) (outlining key elements of a “fair process” for guiding public health decisions, 
including: transparency about the basis of a decision, appeals to common rationales that fair minded 
people can accept as relevant to meeting health needs fairly; and procedures for appealing/revising 
decisions).  
 350. Massachusetts Prescription Monitoring Program, Mass. Exec. Office of Health & Human 
Servs. (July 2016), https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/laws-
regs/dph/proposed-regulations/prescription-monitoring-program.htmlstatistics (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). For 
example, the final rule limited mandate coverage to new patient prescriptions for Schedule II/III drugs or 
benzodiazepines, and included myriad exceptions, such as: prescriptions to hospice patients, inpatients, 
children, or in emergency situations; emergency department practitioners who do not anticipate writing a 
Schedule II-V prescription or who prescribe a five-day supply or less; and prescribers who face 
circumstances that render PDMP use impossible).  
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evidence or systematic guiding principles, and thus would stand to 
benefit from a more deliberate and organized path to success. The 
framework articulated herein guides PDMP recommendations, but is 
also generalizable to public health threats that exhibit characteristics 
similar to prescription drug misusenamely, significant public health 
problems that can be addressed with a panoply of policy options. 
To satisfy legality, effectiveness, and ethical criteriamarkers of 
successful public health policymakingPDMPs should follow certain 
guidelines. First, they should include strong confidentiality protections 
and be searchable by authorized health care practitioners (prescribers 
and dispensers) only, to comport with legal and ethical privacy 
requirements. Strong penalties for disclosure of information by 
authorized users, such as medical license suspensions for prescribers, are 
important to provide further confidentiality incentives. Law enforcement 
officials, licensing boards, and researchers351 should be provided with the 
data on a de-identified basis or pursuant to a court-issued warrant or 
subpoena.352 Second, PDMPs should be designed to infringe minimally on 
and assist maximally clinical practice. To this end, the data should be as 
close to real-time as possible, shared across neighboring states, and 
accurate. The databases should be easily searchable and, as soon as 
practicable, integrated into electronic medical records. Third, the 
programs ought to strongly incentivize prescriber participation, first by 
requiring registration and abandoning laws that provide immunity for 
failure to check or no obligation to query. Mandates with appropriate 
exceptions should be considered once further evidence of existing 
mandate efficacy (and possible unintended consequences) becomes 
available.353 Fourth, PDMPs should include user guidelines and education 
about how to use the data effectively.354 This would help to somewhat 
standardize opioid treatments across providers and prevent unintended 
consequences, such as under-prescribing for pain and burdening certain 
populations based on doctor shopping or diverter stereotypes. Finally, 
the existence and features of programs should be publicized to 
stakeholders, and any changes to their features going forward should 
incorporate diverse perspectives. 
PDMPs undoubtedly show promise and should be pursued by the 
states, but they are still imperfect laws in need of adjustment and 
continued study. Effectiveness research should focus on evaluating 
 
 351. Researchers receive data on a de-identified basis in thirty-two states at present. Nat’l All. 
for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 22.  
 352. See Unger, supra note 223. 
 353. See Haffajee et al., supra note 70. 
 354. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has convened an expert panel to develop 
guidelines on opioid prescribing that will be available in 2016. These guidelines should help to develop 
additional clinical agreement in the clinical field and may be used to inform PDMP use, once available.  
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newer, strong PDMP features (such as mandates) using long-term, multi-
state designs, when possible, that incorporate comparison groups or 
outcomes. Increased evidence linking PDMPs to improved prescribing, 
reduced diversion and doctor shopping, and reduced overdoses, in 
particular, is needed. Study of the interactive effects of PDMPs and other 
prescription drug misuse interventions is also desirable, as these 
interventions are often enacted together. Such evidence will further 
illuminate PDMP features appropriate for retention and replication. 
Incorporation of the recommendations articulated herein and ongoing 
re-evaluation of programs are both critical in order for PDMPs to fulfill 
their potential to curb the opioid misuse and overdose epidemic in the 
United States.  
   
HAFFAJEE_19 (LANGONE) (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016 4:34 PM 
1688 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1621 
Appendix Table. Literature Review:  
Published Studies of PDMP Effectiveness in Addressing 
Opioid Misuse, 1990–2015 
 
 
Part I.  Study Citations and Design Types 
 
Study No. 1.  Delcher et al., supra note 297Interrupted time series 
 with comparison groups. 
 
Study No. 2.  Paulozzi et al., supra note 288Multiple parallel time 
 series, comparing groups without interruption. 
 
Study No. 3.  Reifler et al., supra note 290Controlled pre-post. 
 
Study No. 4.  Reisman et al., supra note 290Multiple parallel time 
 series display with controlled pre-post regression analysis.  
 
Study No. 5.  Jane E. Brady et al., Prescription Drug Monitoring and 
Dispensing of Prescription Opioids, 129 Pub. Health Reps. 
139 (2014)Controlled pre-post. 
 
Study No. 6.  Paulozzi et al., supra note 288, and see design type above in 
 Study No. 2. 
 
Study No. 7.  Reisman et al., supra note 290, and see design type above 
 in Study No. 4.  
 
Study No. 8.  Rutkow et al., supra note 167Interrupted time series 
 with comparison group.  
 
Study No. 9.  Baehren et al., supra note 295Un-controlled pre-post. 
 
  Study No. 10.  McAllister et al., supra note 295Un-controlled pre-post. 
 
  Study No. 11.  Rasubala et al., supra note 302Un-controlled pre-post. 
 
  Study No. 12.  Ringwalt et al., supra note 295Un-controlled post only.  
 
  Study No. 13.  Rutkow et al., supra note 167, and see design type above 
   in Study No. 8. 
 
  Study No. 14.  Weiner et al., supra note 295Un-controlled pre-post.  
 
  Study No. 15.  Simoni-Wastila & Qian, supra note 296Cross-sectional.  
 
  Study No. 16.  Surratt et al., supra note 296Un-controlled pre-post.  
 
 
The numbers associated with each study listed on this page can be used to 
locate the data source, PDMP measure, findings, and methodological 
comments related to that study below in Part II of this Appendix Table.  
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Part II.  Data Sources, PDMP Measures, Findings, 
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lower rates of 
opioid overdose 
mortality or lower 
rates of opioid 
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Strengths: Only national 
study to assess relationship 
between PDMPs and 
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conducted when PDMPs 
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comparisons within states. 
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intervention measures. 
Displays time trends. 
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implementation (2005). No 
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prescribe opioids 
in 9.5% cases: 
6.5% patients 
received opioids 
that were not 
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planned, and 3% 




Strengths: Careful survey of 
physician prescribing plans 
before and after consulting 
PDMP.  
 
Limitations: Small sample 
(n=38) of physicians, 
limited to Massachusetts 
PDMP, so results have 
limited generalizability. 
Responses subject to 
response bias. No 
comparison group. 
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